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THE LIMITS OF ADVOCACY 
AMANDA FROST† 
ABSTRACT 
  Party control over case presentation is regularly cited as a defining 
characteristic of the American adversarial system. Accordingly, 
American judges are strongly discouraged from engaging in so-called 
“issue creation”—that is, raising legal claims and arguments that the 
parties have overlooked or ignored—on the ground that doing so is 
antithetical to an adversarial legal culture that values litigant 
autonomy and prohibits agenda setting by judges. And yet, despite the 
rhetoric, federal judges regularly inject new legal issues into ongoing 
cases. Landmark Supreme Court decisions such as Erie Railroad 
Co. v. Tompkins and Mapp v. Ohio were decided on grounds never 
raised by the parties, and nearly every term the Supreme Court adds 
to the questions presented or assigns an amicus to argue an issue that 
the parties have no interest in discussing. These practices operate 
mostly under the academic radar, and thus there have been few 
attempts to theorize deviations from the norm of party presentation. 
  This Article defends judicial issue creation as a necessary corollary 
to the federal judiciary’s constitutional obligation to articulate the 
meaning of contested questions of law. Federal courts do not simply 
resolve disputes between parties; they are also responsible for making 
pronouncements of law that are binding on all who come after. When 
the parties fail to raise relevant legal claims and arguments—whether 
by error or through conscious choice—judges must do so themselves 
to avoid issuing inaccurate or incomplete statements of law. Although 
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issue creation is often criticized as judicial overreaching, courts can 
use this authority to limit the scope of their decisions, narrowing the 
broad propositions of law relied on by the parties. Furthermore, 
judicial power to raise issues sua sponte is compatible with adversary 
theory as long as judges are careful to avoid slipping into the role of 
advocate, and make sure to preserve an opportunity for a dialectical 
exchange between the parties on new questions raised by the court. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Party control over case presentation is a central tenet of the 
American adversarial legal system. An adversarial system is typically 
defined as one in which the parties present the facts and legal 
arguments to an impartial and passive decisionmaker, who then 
decides cases on their terms. Indeed, party presentation is cited as the 
major distinction between the adversarial system in the United States 
and the inquisitorial systems of continental Europe, where judges 
take the lead in the investigation and presentation of the case.1 
Accordingly, American judges are strongly discouraged from 
engaging in so-called “issue creation”—that is, raising legal claims 
and arguments that the parties have overlooked or ignored—on the 
ground that doing so is antithetical to a legal culture that values 
litigant autonomy and prohibits agenda setting by judges.2 
In light of the entrenched norm in favor of party presentation, 
what should a court do when the parties to litigation, either 
intentionally or by mistake, fail to raise key legal arguments? For 
example, what if the parties ignore a statute that would resolve their 
dispute, asking that the judge instead address a difficult constitutional 
question that the judge would prefer to avoid?3 Or what if the parties 
 
 1. See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 n.2 (1991) (“What makes a system 
adversarial rather than inquisitorial is . . . the presence of a judge who does not (as an inquisitor 
does) conduct the factual and legal investigation himself, but instead decides on the basis of 
facts and arguments pro and con adduced by the parties.”). See generally John H. Langbein, The 
German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (1985) (comparing the roles of 
lawyers and judges in the American and German legal systems). 
 2. See infra notes 42–43. 
 3. E.g., Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454, 457 (1960). 
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agree on the meaning of a constitutional provision, differing only over 
its application, and yet the judge thinks that both parties have 
misinterpreted the constitutional text at issue?4 What should happen 
if the parties fail to raise a legal argument or to use an interpretive 
theory on which the judge would like to rely?5 All of these “what ifs” 
describe actual cases in which courts were forced to choose between 
violating the norm of party presentation, on the one hand, or issuing 
an opinion containing inaccurate and misleading statements about the 
meaning of the law, on the other. 
Despite the rhetoric in favor of party presentation, judicial issue 
creation is not uncommon. Indeed, some of the Supreme Court’s 
landmark cases were decided on grounds that were never raised by 
the parties. For example, in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,6 neither 
the petitioner nor the respondent took issue with Swift v. Tyson’s7 
holding that federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction could create 
federal common law,8 and yet the Court overruled Swift and required 
federal courts to abide by state common law rules.9 Although the 
parties in Washington v. Davis10 agreed that the Equal Protection 
Clause barred conduct having a disparate racial impact,11 the Court 
rejected that view and held that the Constitution prohibits only 
intentional discrimination.12 Most recently, in Dickerson v. United 
States,13 both the Fourth Circuit14 and the Supreme Court15 questioned 
whether a federal statute governed the admission of confessions, 
displacing the Court’s ruling in Miranda v. Arizona,16 even though 
neither party relied on that statute.17 These cases are not outliers: the 
U.S. Supreme Court frequently rewrites the questions presented, 
 
 4. E.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238 (1976). 
 5. E.g., Phillips/May Corp. v. United States, 524 F.3d 1264, 1269–70 & n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 6. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 7. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
 8. Erie, 304 U.S. at 66 (argument for petitioner); id. at 68 (argument for respondent). 
 9. See id. at 80 (holding that by applying Swift v. Tyson, federal courts had assumed 
powers constitutionally reserved to the states). 
 10. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 11. Id. at 238 n.8. 
 12. Id. at 239. 
 13. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), rev’g 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 14. United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 682 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 15. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 437, 441 n.7 (noting that because the parties had not argued 
in favor of the statute’s constitutionality, the Court had invited amicus curiae to do so). 
 16. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 17. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 437, 441 n.7; Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 682. 
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adds new questions, and even assigns amici to argue positions that no 
party defends.18 Such practices coexist uneasily within an adversarial 
tradition that supposedly gives the parties, and not the judge, control 
over case presentation. 
Neither courts nor legal commentators have acknowledged the 
many institutionalized judicial practices that seem to undermine the 
norm against issue creation. To the contrary, judicial opinions and the 
academic literature confidently promote party presentation, and are 
critical of judges who raise issues sua sponte.19 The lack of a 
conceptual framework to support judicial issue creation discourages 
some judges from raising issues sua sponte even when there are 
compelling reasons to do so, and leaves those judges who do 
supplement the parties’ legal arguments open to the charge that they 
have transgressed the bounds of judicial power to further their 
personal ideological agenda.20 As a purely practical matter, then, the 
tension between the rhetoric in favor of party presentation and the 
actual practice is one that deserves further discussion for the benefit 
of judges struggling to reconcile their conflicting obligations in 
specific cases. 
From a jurisprudential perspective, the issue goes to the core of 
what judges, particularly federal judges, are asked to do.21 Federal 
 
 18. See infra Part I.B. 
 19. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Court Should Have Remained Silent: Why the Court 
Erred in Deciding Dickerson v. United States, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 292 (2000) (“[T]he courts 
exceeded the appropriate judicial role in raising a major constitutional issue not presented by 
the parties . . . .”); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 
388 (1978) (asserting that the system works best when the decisionmaker “rests his decision 
wholly on the proofs and argument actually presented to him by the parties”); infra note 42 and 
accompanying text. 
  An exception is Neal Devins’s article defending the Fourth Circuit’s sua sponte 
questioning of the continuing validity of Miranda in its decision in Dickerson v. United States. 
Neal Devins, Asking the Right Questions: How the Courts Honored the Separation of Powers by 
Reconsidering Miranda, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 251, 253 (2000). Professor Devins argues 
convincingly in support of the Fourth Circuit, but does not purport to defend sua sponte 
decisionmaking in circumstances outside of the unique situation presented by Dickerson. See id. 
at 277 (noting that “Dickerson is a truly unusual case” and commenting that he “do[es] not 
mean to suggest that courts ought to search out ways to decide cases in which the executive is 
unwilling to defend the constitutionality of an act of Congress”). 
 20. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 19, at 302 (“[I]n Dickerson, the Fourth Circuit 
invoked § 3501 over the objections of the parties precisely because it wanted to reach a 
particular result: upholding its constitutionality.”). 
 21. Some of this Article’s arguments regarding judicial power to raise new issues of law 
would apply to state as well as federal judges. Much of this Article focuses on the role of the 
federal courts in the constitutional structure, however, and thus the power of state courts may 
differ depending on their place in state government. 
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judges serve a dual role: they must resolve the concrete disputes 
before them, and yet under the constitutional structure and in the 
common law tradition they are also expected to make accurate 
statements about the meaning of law that govern beyond the 
parameters of the parties and their dispute.22 Usually, the dispute-
resolution and law-pronouncement functions complement one 
another because judges are more likely to reach the “right” legal 
answer when two parties, each with a stake in the matter, compete to 
present the most persuasive case to the court. But when the parties 
fail to fulfill their role in the adversary system—whether by error or 
through conscious choice—judges must choose between dispute 
resolution and law pronouncement. They may either decide the 
dispute on the parties’ chosen terms, as the adversary model would 
seem to require, or introduce new grounds for a decision on their own 
initiative, producing a judicially driven, but more accurate, statement 
of law. This tension between the two central functions of the federal 
judge suggests that it is worth taking a closer look at the norm against 
judicial issue creation. 
This Article contends that there are good reasons to promote 
judicial issue creation in certain categories of cases. Issue creation is 
an essential means of protecting the judiciary’s role in the 
constitutional structure. As the third branch of government, federal 
judges are assigned the task of settling the meaning of disputed 
questions of law, not just for the parties, but for all who must comply 
with it. Furthermore, they must do so free from outside influence. As 
a result, courts have the power to look beyond the parties’ arguments 
 
 22. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller’s Theory of Adjudication and the False 
Dichotomy Between Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of Litigation, 75 B.U. L. REV. 
1273, 1275 (1995) (“Almost everyone today would agree that adjudication is about articulating 
public norms as well as settling private disputes . . . .”); Robert M. Cover, The Uses of 
Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639, 643 
(1981) (“Adjudication in the common law mold entails two simultaneously performed functions: 
dispute resolution and norm articulation.”); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Participation, 
Responsiveness, and the Consultative Process: An Essay for Lon Fuller, 92 HARV. L. REV. 410, 
412 (1978) (“One function of adjudication is the settlement of past disputes. Frequently the 
adjudicator assumes a second function of making rules to govern future conduct.”); Owen M. 
Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 30 
(1979) (stating that “dispute resolution may be one consequence of the judicial decision” but the 
“function of the judge” is to “give the proper meaning to our public values”); Chad M. 
Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism: Models of Adjudication and the Duty to Decide, 94 GEO. 
L.J. 121, 137–38 & n.51 (2005) (discussing the courts’ dual function of dispute resolution and law 
pronouncement, and stating that “there is general agreement that both functions play some role 
in adjudication”). 
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when failing to do so would lead to an inaccurate or incomplete 
description of the law. 
Furthermore, because federal judges operate within a common 
law system in which the precedent in one case establishes the law for 
all who follow, it is particularly important that they make accurate 
statements about the meaning of law. Lower federal courts are bound 
by hierarchical precedent, and stare decisis instructs that judges 
should not reject their own court’s past precedent absent special 
circumstances.23 In a legal system in which appellate opinions not only 
establish the meaning of law, but do so through precedent that binds 
future litigants, courts cannot cede to the parties control over legal 
analysis.24 In truth, as will be discussed in Part I, judges in the United 
States often reach beyond the four corners of the parties’ briefing 
when they think that the parties have not accurately described the 
law. This Article defends that choice. 
To be sure, the parties are essential to the exercise of federal 
judicial power; without them, there would be no “[c]ase[]” or 
“[c]ontrovers[y]” on which a federal court could act.25 The parties are 
also in the best position to find and make all the arguments in their 
favor, and usually (though not always) can be relied upon to do so. 
Issue creation should not be an everyday occurrence, because it can 
lead to delay, disrupt settled expectations, and undermine litigant 
autonomy.26 Yet the parties cannot be allowed to completely control 
the judiciary’s statements of law, or even the interpretive process, lest 
they undermine the federal courts’ role to independently ascertain 
the meaning of legal texts for the benefit of all. 
Although judicial issue creation itself has not received much 
attention, striking the right balance between dispute resolution and 
law pronouncement has long been the subject of debate among legal 
academics. Lon Fuller is most closely associated with the traditionally 
adversarial “dispute resolution” model of adjudication, in which 
private disputes are resolved by a neutral and passive 
 
 23. See infra Part II.D. 
 24. In common law jurisdictions, “precedents were not merely evidence of the law but the 
law itself.” GEORGE P. FLETCHER & STEVE SHEPPARD, AMERICAN LAW IN A GLOBAL 
CONTEXT 35 (2005). In civil law countries, “cases are merely evidence of the law.” Id. at 36. 
 25. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 26. See infra Part IV for further discussion of the criteria that should govern issue creation. 
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decisionmaker.27 In contrast, scholars such as Owen Fiss and Abram 
Chayes described a “public values” model that they claimed better 
suits modern, public law litigation in which judges articulate legal 
standards that affect large numbers of stakeholders.28 As these 
scholars themselves recognized, however, the complex, multipurpose 
act of adjudication need not be forced into one of two polarized 
camps.29 Any viable model of adjudication has to make room for both 
dispute resolution and law pronouncement, without sacrificing either 
function for the sake of the other. Rather than deepening the 
dichotomy, this Article attempts to bring these two functions of 
adjudication closer together by describing how federal courts can 
reconcile their duty to decide cases through the adversarial system 
with their competing constitutional and common law obligations to 
establish legal standards for the nation. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I.A describes the norm 
against judicial issue creation and discusses the rationales that 
underlie it. Part I.B then makes the descriptive claim that, in practice, 
the norm is weaker than the rhetoric promoting it would suggest. Part 
II seeks to bridge the gap between rhetoric and practice by laying out 
a defense of judicial issue creation grounded upon the federal 
judiciary’s constitutional obligation to declare the meaning of federal 
law free from outside influence. Part III discusses how courts can 
balance dispute resolution with law pronouncement—the subject of 
longstanding debate among proceduralists—and explores ways in 
which the adversarial system can account for the latter task. Finally, 
Part IV translates theory into practice by describing the criteria that 
 
 27. See Fuller, supra note 19, at 364 (characterizing adjudication as a process that gives the 
private parties whose interests are at stake the opportunity to present arguments in their favor 
to a neutral arbiter). 
 28. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1281, 1282–84 (1976) (contrasting the “traditional” model of adjudication as “a vehicle for 
settling disputes between private parties about private rights” with a “public law” model where 
“the object of litigation is the vindication of constitutional or statutory policies”); Owen M. Fiss, 
Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) (stating that the “job” of a judge 
“is not to maximize the ends of private parties . . . but to explicate and give force to the values 
embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and statutes”); Fiss, supra note 22, at 30 
(arguing that “dispute resolution may be one consequence of” adjudication, but the “function of 
the judge . . . is not to resolve disputes, but to give the proper meaning to our public values”); 
Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27, 34–35 
(2003) (discussing the differences between Fuller’s and Chayes’s models of litigation). 
 29. Cf. Bone, supra note 22, at 1275 (asserting that Lon Fuller’s theory of adjudication has 
been distorted by scholars who wrongly perceive of Fuller as promoting a “dispute resolution 
model” that stands in polar opposition to Chayes and Fiss’s “public law model”). 
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judges may consider when deciding whether to raise new legal issues 
or arguments that have gone unmentioned by the parties, and 
suggests that courts carefully weigh the costs to the parties of raising 
new issues against the benefits of preserving the judiciary’s law-
pronouncement function. 
The arguments in favor of judicial issue creation are not trump 
cards that always outweigh the strong rationales against it. 
Nonetheless, good arguments for the practice do exist. The purpose 
of this Article is to demonstrate that judicial issue creation is not a 
deviant act of judicial overreaching, and to provide a defense for a 
practice that operates mostly under the academic radar and without 
explanation or support. By articulating the rationales supporting 
judicial issue creation—rationales that are currently absent from most 
judicial opinions and academic commentary—I hope this Article will 
assist judges in determining when raising new issues is a legitimate 
exercise of judicial power, and defend judges that do so from charges 
of overstepping. 
I.  THE PARTY PRESENTATION NORM 
The rhetoric in favor of party presentation is not always 
consistent with actual judicial practice. Part I.A defines the norm 
against judicial issue creation and describes how party presentation is 
viewed as an essential aspect of the adversarial system. Part I.B points 
out occasions on which courts deviate from the norm, usually without 
providing an explanation for doing so, and argues that these 
exceptions suggest that issue creation is sometimes justified. 
A. The Norm against Judicial Issue Creation 
1. Defining the Norm.  Before discussing the rationale underlying 
the norm against judicial issue creation, a clarification of terms is 
needed. This Article repeatedly refers to the norm in favor of “party 
presentation” and against “judicial issue creation,” which is also 
sometimes described as the prohibition against “sua sponte 
decisionmaking.” These terms are used by political scientists, legal 
scholars, and jurists as shorthand for the conventional view that the 
parties to litigation, and not the judge, are responsible for raising the 
legal questions that will ultimately be resolved by the court.30 As the 
 
 30. See, e.g., Greenlaw v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2559, 2564 (2008) (describing the 
“principle of party presentation,” under which “the parties . . . frame the issues for decision” 
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U.S. Supreme Court explained in its recent decision in Greenlaw v. 
United States:31 
In our adversary system, in both civil and criminal cases, in the first 
instance and on appeal, we follow the principle of party 
presentation. That is, we rely on the parties to frame the issues for 
decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters 
the parties present.32 
Not all judicial involvement in case presentation, however, would 
violate the norm as typically described. Indeed, if the party 
presentation rule were taken literally, courts would violate it simply 
by relying on overlooked legal sources, such as judicial precedent that 
the parties did not cite. But the norm does not extend to such 
minimally proactive judicial conduct, which is viewed as well within 
judicial power, and thus is not the focus of this Article.33 
In contrast, the norm against issue creation clearly discourages 
judges from raising new legal claims missed by the parties. For 
example, if the parties differ over the meaning of a particular 
statutory provision, but neither party cites or relies upon a different 
statute that appears to resolve their dispute, judges will generally 
claim that they lack the authority to rely on the uncited statute to 
decide the case.34 Likewise, if the parties fail to raise a constitutional 
challenge to a statute, the norm generally bars courts from doing so 
 
and the courts take on “the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present”); Sarah M.R. 
Cravens, Involved Appellate Judging, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 251, 251 (2004) (discussing uncertainty 
about the extent to which a court “may choose to consider . . . an issue [not raised by the 
parties] sua sponte”); Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal & Timothy Johnson, The Claim of Issue 
Creation on the U.S. Supreme Court, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 845, 845 (1996) (describing the 
“practice disfavoring the creation of issues not raised in the record before the Court” as a 
“norm”); Eric D. Miller, Comment, Should Courts Consider 18 USC § 3501 Sua Sponte?, 65 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1029, 1049 (1998) (“In practice, it is unusual for courts to consider issues sua 
sponte . . . .”). 
 31. Greenlaw v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2559 (2008). 
 32. Id. at 2564. 
 33. See, e.g., Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 511–12 (1994) (holding that an appellate 
court should take notice of relevant legal precedent overlooked by the parties). It is worth 
noting that the unquestioned judicial power to sua sponte take notice of relevant precedent 
suggests that judges have an obligation to pronounce upon an objective version of the law, and 
not simply the parties’ subjective view of it—an observation that supports giving judges broader 
power to raise overlooked legal claims and arguments. 
 34. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488, 497 (D.C. Cir. 
2004) (refusing to address sua sponte a legal argument that the parties had failed to raise). 
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sua sponte.35 And if neither party questions whether a regulation is 
authorized by a federal statute, the courts will interpret and apply the 
regulation without addressing that question.36 Although judges have 
at times reached these issues despite the norm, as will be described in 
detail in Part I.B, the general understanding is that they should not. 
A closer question is whether the norm prohibits judicial creation 
of a new legal theory to support a party’s existing claim. For example, 
if a party asserts that a statute’s plain language is in its favor, but fails 
to cite or make any arguments regarding legislative history, can a 
court sua sponte take notice of the legislative history and craft an 
argument about statutory meaning on that basis, or has the party 
forfeited any such argument by failing to discuss it?37 This type of 
issue creation falls in a gray area in which some judges think they are 
free to raise additional arguments that support a party’s claims, while 
others contend courts should not go so far.38 Thus, although the norm 
does not clearly apply here, it nonetheless maintains some residual 
influence over courts trained to assume that parties control case 
presentation. Confusion over the judicial role in borderline cases 
further underscores the need to develop a rationale to govern judicial 
discretion to raise issues and arguments overlooked by the parties. 
2. Rationales for the Norm.  Party control over case presentation 
is described as an essential aspect of the American adversarial 
 
 35. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1640 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I 
also note that whether the Act constitutes a permissible exercise of Congress’ power under the 
Commerce Clause is not before the Court. The parties did not raise or brief that issue; it is 
outside the question presented; and the lower courts did not address it.”); Whitman v. Am. 
Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 486–87 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting, but declining to 
address, a potential constitutional problem with a federal statute because the parties did not 
raise the issue). 
 36. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 279 (2001) (“We do not inquire here 
whether the DOJ regulation was authorized by § 602 . . . . The petition for writ of certiorari 
raised, and we agreed to review, only the question . . . whether there is a private cause of action 
to enforce the regulation.”). 
 37. See, e.g., Phillips/May Corp. v. United States, 524 F.3d 1264, 1270 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(noting that neither party cited legislative history that the court found dispositive of a legal 
question in the case). 
 38. Compare Bombardier, 380 F.3d at 497 (refusing to address sua sponte a legal argument 
that the parties had failed to raise), and Warner v. Aetna Health Inc., 333 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1154 
n.7 (W.D. Okla. 2004) (refusing to address a legal argument not raised by the parties), with 
Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991) (“When an issue or claim is properly 
before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, 
but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of 
governing law.”). 
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system.39 The federal reporter is replete with cases asserting that 
courts have “no right to consider issues not raised by a party”—a 
position routinely accepted by every circuit court in the country.40 As 
Justice Scalia declared in a concurrence: “The rule that points not 
argued will not be considered is more than just a prudential rule of 
convenience; its observance, at least in the vast majority of cases, 
distinguishes our adversary system of justice from the inquisitorial 
one.”41 
Legal scholars agree that the norm against judicial issue creation 
is firmly entrenched in adversarial theory. As Judith Resnik has 
observed, “our tradition is considered more adversarial than most, 
and its basic principle is that the parties, not the judge, have the major 
responsibility for and control over the definition of the dispute.”42 
 
 39. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 380 n.23 (1982) 
(“Some proceduralists identify ‘party-presentation’ and ‘party-prosecution’ as the two 
fundamental elements of adversarialism.”); supra note 1. 
 40. See, e.g., Clements v. Serco, Inc., 530 F.3d 1224, 1229 n.4 (10th Cir. 2008) (declining to 
decide the case on grounds not raised by the parties); e360 Insight v. Spamhaus Project, 500 F.3d 
594, 599 (7th Cir. 2007) (declining to raise an affirmative defense sua sponte); Kropelnicki v. 
Siegel, 290 F.3d 118, 130 n.7 (2d Cir. 2002) (stating that statutes of limitations ordinarily should 
not be raised sua sponte); Curry v. Beatrice Pocahontas Coal Co., 67 F.3d 517, 522 n.8 (4th Cir. 
1995) (“The normal rule of course is that failure to raise an issue for review in the prescribed 
manner constitutes a waiver.”); Hardiman v. Reynolds, 971 F.2d 500, 502 (10th Cir. 1992) 
(“Generally, where the parties have not raised a defense, the court should not address the 
defense sua sponte.”); Bolden v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 953 F.2d 807, 812 (3d Cir. 1991) (en 
banc) (“We do not generally consider issues not raised by the parties . . . .”); Izquierdo Prieto v. 
Mercado Rosa, 894 F.2d 467, 471 n.4 (1st Cir. 1990) (“Ordinarily, we would decline to raise a 
defense sua sponte that a party had failed to raise on his own behalf.”); Carducci v. Regan, 714 
F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“The premise of our adversarial system is that appellate courts 
do not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but essentially as arbiters of legal 
questions presented and argued by the parties before them.”). 
 41. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 246 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 42. Resnik, supra note 39, at 382 (footnote omitted); see also Greenlaw v. United States, 
128 S. Ct. 2559, 2564 (2008) (“In our adversary system, in both civil and criminal cases, in the 
first instance and on appeal, we follow the principle of party presentation. That is, we rely on 
the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of 
matters the parties present.”); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 n.2 (1991) (“What makes 
a system adversarial . . . is . . . the presence of a judge who does not (as an inquisitor does) 
conduct the factual and legal investigation himself, but instead decides on the basis of facts and 
arguments pro and con adduced by the parties.”); Carducci, 714 F.2d at 177 (“The premise of 
our adversarial system is that appellate courts do not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry 
and research, but essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented and argued by the parties 
before them.”); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 268 (5th ed. 2007) (“In 
American courts that are committed to the adversary system, generally judges are supposed to 
rule only on motions brought by the parties.”); Epstein et al., supra note 30, at 845 (describing 
the “practice disfavoring the creation of issues not raised in the record before the Court” as a 
“norm”); Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. 
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Stephan Landsman, a scholar of the adversarial system, declared that 
“reliance on party presentation of evidence” is one of the “key 
elements” of adversarialism.43 Likewise, in her critique of adversarial 
process, Ellen Sward explained that the “adversary system is 
characterized by party control of the investigation and presentation of 
evidence and argument, and by a passive decisionmaker who merely 
listens to both sides and renders a decision based on what she has 
heard.”44 
The norm against judicial issue creation is grounded in American 
cultural conceptions regarding the proper role of the judiciary in a 
constitutional democracy. American legal culture promotes litigant 
autonomy over control by government actors, particularly when those 
actors are unelected, and thus unaccountable, members of the federal 
judicial branch.45 The litigants’ control of case presentation is thought 
to promote dignitary and participation values by “affirm[ing] human 
individuality” and showing “respect for the opinions of each party,” 
producing an outcome more satisfying to winners and losers alike.46 
Professor Landsman explained: “Adversary theory holds that if a 
party is intimately involved in the adjudicatory process and feels that 
he has been given a fair opportunity to present his case, he is likely to 
accept the results whether favorable or not.”47 
In contrast, a judge-dominated inquisitorial system is viewed as 
uniquely un-American in its emphasis on management of litigation by 
government bureaucrats, and the concomitant disempowerment of 
the private litigant. As David Sklansky recently observed, 
 
L.J. 301, 302 (1989) (“The adversary system is characterized by party control of the investigation 
and presentation of evidence and argument, and by a passive decisionmaker who merely listens 
to both sides and renders a decision based on what she has heard.”). 
 43. STEPHAN LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN 
APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION 2 (1988); see also id. (“The adversary system relies on a neutral 
and passive decision maker to adjudicate disputes after they have been aired by the adversaries 
in a contested proceeding.”). 
 44. Sward, supra note 42, at 302; see also Devins, supra note 19, at 252 (“[A] central tenet 
of our adversarial system is that (save for jurisdictional issues) the parties to a case—not the 
judges deciding the case—raise the legal arguments.”). 
 45. See, e.g., STEPHEN N. SUBRIN & MARGARET Y.K. WOO, LITIGATING IN AMERICA: 
CIVIL PROCEDURE IN CONTEXT 22–25 (2006); Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market 
Interventions Creating Subsidies and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate 
Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2130 (2000) (identifying the freedom of civil litigants to 
“make their way through the adversarial processes . . . on their own” as a premise “deeply 
embedded within United States culture”). 
 46. LANDSMAN, supra note 43, at 33–39. 
 47. Id. at 34. 
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inquisitorialism is an epithet among American judges, practitioners, 
and scholars, and consequently the American legal system has been 
constructed to avoid even the whiff of its judge-dominated 
procedures.48 
The norm against issue creation can even be said to have quasi-
constitutional roots. It has at least a passing relationship to Article 
III’s case or controversy requirement, which limits courts to deciding 
disputes between parties with actual injuries that were caused by the 
legal wrong of which they complain and which are remediable by a 
court. To be sure, courts are not constitutionally barred from raising 
new issues.49 Nonetheless, the principle that the parties, and not the 
judge, should frame cases is grounded upon the same values as those 
underlying the doctrine of standing. Both promote separation of 
powers by preventing courts from setting their own agendas, as is the 
prerogative of the legislature.50 And both ensure that courts decide 
only those issues that are briefed and argued by stakeholders with an 
incentive to adequately represent their interests to the court, which in 
turn will produce better judicial decisions.51 
In addition, the party presentation norm has a relationship to 
some of the core elements of due process. At a minimum, due process 
requires that the state provide notice and an opportunity to be heard 
by an impartial decisionmaker before it can take away life, liberty, or 
property.52 Due process focuses on giving the individual an 
opportunity to present his case, rather than on ensuring that a case is 
accurately and fully argued by some third party who claims to have 
the individual’s interest in mind.53 Furthermore, because the 
decisionmaker must remain impartial, he cannot serve as an advocate 
 
 48. David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1638 (2009) 
(“[T]he vast majority of American scholars, like the vast majority of American judges, are apt to 
agree with the Supreme Court that the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, far from meriting 
emulation, should be studiously avoided — indeed, that avoiding inquisitorial justice is what our 
own system is all about.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 49. See infra Part I.B. 
 50. LANDSMAN, supra note 43, at 34 (“When litigants direct the proceedings, there is little 
opportunity for the judge to pursue her own agenda or to act on her biases.”). 
 51. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–61 (1992); see also Abram 
Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term—Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger 
Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 24 (1982) (stating that standing doctrine “ensur[es] vigorous 
adversary presentation”). 
 52. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). 
 53. Cf. LANDSMAN, supra note 43, at 35 (“Party control . . . . affirms human individuality. It 
mandates respect for the opinions of each party rather than those of his attorney, of the court, 
or of society at large.”). 
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for the interests of either party. The judge’s “detachment” is claimed 
to “preserve[] the appearance of fairness as well as fairness itself.”54 
These characteristics of due process are promoted by the adversarial 
system’s reliance on the parties to take the lead in case presentation.55 
Finally, party presentation serves important practical purposes. It 
promotes judicial economy, efficient resolution of disputes, and 
finality. Requiring that the parties and not the court frame legal issues 
preserves precious judicial resources; courts simply do not have the 
time or personnel to act as auxiliary counsel.56 Cases are most 
efficiently resolved when the parties lay out all of their arguments at 
the outset, giving each side a chance to fully brief and argue the issues 
relevant to their dispute. Moreover, if courts raise new issues at the 
eleventh hour, they risk needlessly extending costly and disruptive 
litigation.57 
For all these reasons, the norm against judicial issue creation 
appears embedded in the American legal system. Yet the significant 
number of exceptions to the norm discussed below demonstrates that 
it is less foundational than the rhetoric would suggest. 
B. Exceptions to the Norm 
Courts have developed a number of doctrinal exceptions to the 
party presentation rule, some of which are so broadly worded as to 
essentially give courts carte blanche to raise new issues at any time.58 
Such exceptions include: the ability of courts to examine jurisdictional 
questions sua sponte, the justification of issue creation for exceptional 
 
 54. Id. at 34 (“Because the judge seldom takes the lead in conducting the proceedings, she 
is unlikely to appear to be partisan or to become embroiled in the contest. Her detachment 
preserves the appearance of fairness as well as fairness itself.”). 
 55. Id. at 37 (noting that due process requires judicial neutrality and an opportunity to 
present evidence). 
 56. See id. at 35 (“According to adversary theory, when each actor performs only a single 
function the dispute before the court will be resolved in the fairest and most efficient way.”). 
 57. E.g., United States v. Wiseman, 297 F.3d 975, 980 (10th Cir. 2002) (declining to raise a 
new issue sua sponte because it would delay resolution of the litigation). 
 58. See THOMAS B. MARVELL, APPELLATE COURTS AND LAWYERS: INFORMATION 
GATHERING IN THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 124 (1978) (“[One] court rule, applied to issues not 
raised at trial as well as on appeal, is that issues not raised will be ignored unless doing so would 
result in an injustice. . . . [T]his is a very uncertain standard, and it leaves the judges a good deal 
of discretion. . . . Other courts often use ‘justice’ or other elusive standards, such as ‘plain error’ 
or ‘fundamental error,’ in determining when to decide an issue not raised.”); see also Adam A. 
Milani & Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A Critical Look at Sua Sponte Decisions by Appellate 
Courts, 69 TENN. L. REV. 245, 248 (2002) (noting that despite the rhetoric against sua sponte 
decisionmaking by courts, “raising issues sua sponte is not an uncommon practice”). 
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issues on the merits, procedural rules and practices allowing for 
modification of the questions presented, and the use of amicus curiae. 
These exceptions coexist uneasily with the party presentation rule, 
with no judicial acknowledgement that they are seemingly at odds 
with a primary characteristic of the adversary system. 
1. Jurisdiction.  The best-known exception to the party 
presentation rule permits courts to question their capacity or 
suitability to hear a case or a specific issue. For example, courts will 
investigate their subject matter jurisdiction, the litigant’s standing to 
sue, and whether federalism or comity concerns counsel judicial 
restraint, even if the parties fail to raise these issues. Indeed, federal 
judges are obligated to establish that a case falls within one of the 
subject matter headings of Article III to ensure that they do not 
impinge on the role of the other two branches of the federal 
government or undermine state courts.59 Likewise, Article III limits 
federal judicial power to “Cases” or “Controversies,” and thus federal 
courts must find that the plaintiff has standing—that is, a concrete 
injury, caused by the challenged conduct, which a court can remedy—
before presiding over that plaintiff’s case.60 A court’s responsibility to 
satisfy itself of its jurisdiction to proceed is rationalized as necessary 
to maintain the judiciary’s limited role in the constitutional 
structure.61 
Although not constitutionally compelled to do so, courts will 
raise preclusion, abstention, and sovereign immunity in a similar spirit 
of judicial restraint.62 Courts justify raising questions of issue and 
claim preclusion sua sponte as necessary to protect the resources and 
integrity of the federal judiciary.63 Abstention and sovereign 
immunity are given special attention out of concern for state 
sovereignty, which courts argue must be protected from litigants who 
might not have state interests in mind.64 
 
 59. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 258 (3d ed. 1999). 
 60. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–61 (1992). 
 61. Id. 
 62. See, e.g., Cincinnati Indem. Co. v. A&K Constr. Co, 542 F.3d 623, 625 (8th Cir. 2008) 
(raising abstention sua sponte); Nair v. Oakland County Cmty. Mental Health Auth., 443 F.3d 
461, 474 (6th Cir. 2006) (raising sovereign immunity sua sponte); Scherer v. Equitable Life 
Assurance Soc’y, 347 F.3d 394, 398 n.4 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that “a court is free to raise [res 
judicata] sua sponte”). 
 63. See, e.g., Salahuddin v. Jones, 992 F.2d 447, 449 (2d Cir.1993). 
 64. See, e.g., Cincinnati Indem. Co., 542 F.3d at 624–25 (raising abstention sua sponte); 
Nair, 443 F.3d at 474 (raising sovereign immunity sua sponte). 
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The rationales for these exceptions have potentially broad 
application. The judiciary’s interest in protecting the constitutionally 
demarcated limits on its authority, preserving judicial resources, and 
protecting interests beyond those of the parties would justify issue 
creation in a wide range of situations, and thus could extend beyond 
questions of prudential and constitutional limits on federal 
jurisdiction. 
2. Merits.  The second and more amorphous category of 
exceptions includes merits issues that are in some way exceptional. 
Judges justify raising issues sua sponte to avoid plain error, or 
because it is in the public interest to do so, or to prevent a miscarriage 
of justice.65 This second category of exceptions is not much of a 
category at all, because judges have not articulated a clear set of 
conditions that lead them to deviate from their typical practice of 
letting the parties frame the dispute. A leading treatise on Supreme 
Court practice acknowledged that the Court’s practice is ad hoc: 
Analysis of other cases in which the Court considered a question not 
presented in a petition suggests that the exception from the normal 
rule is not circumscribed by any particular formula, and that it 
reflects the Court’s discretionary authority to dispose of cases in 
what it determines to be the most sensible and reasonable way.66 
Federal circuit courts similarly act with little rhyme or reason.67 The 
absence of principled guidelines governing judicial issue creation has 
 
 65. See, e.g., Curry v. Beatrice Pocahontas Coal Co., 67 F.3d 517, 522 n.8 (4th Cir. 1995) 
(“The normal rule of course is that the failure to raise an issue for review in the prescribed 
manner constitutes a waiver. But the rule is not an absolute one and review may proceed (even 
completely sua sponte) when the equities require.” (citation omitted)); Lambert v. Genesee 
Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 56 (2d Cir. 1993) (“We recognize that th[e] issue was not presented to this 
court . . . . However, we have discretion to consider and decide sua sponte a dispositive issue of 
law . . . .”); Counts v. Kissack Water & Oil Serv., Inc., 986 F.2d 1322, 1325–26 (10th Cir. 1993) 
(“Although it is rarely done, an appellate court may, sua sponte, raise a dispositive issue of law 
when the proper resolution is beyond doubt and the failure to address the issue would result in a 
miscarriage of justice.”). 
 66. ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 346 (7th ed. 1993). 
 67. See United States v. Boyd, 208 F.3d 638, 651 (7th Cir. 2000) (Ripple, J., dissenting), 
judgment vacated, 531 U.S. 1135 (2001) (“There is . . . no rigid and undeviating judicially 
declared practice under which courts of review invariably and under all circumstances decline to 
consider all questions which have not previously been specifically urged. . . . Exceptional cases 
or particular circumstances may prompt a reviewing court, where injustice might otherwise 
result or where public policy requires, to consider questions neither pressed nor passed upon 
below.” (first alteration in original) (quoting Nuelsen v. Sorensen, 293 F.2d 454, 462 (9th Cir. 
1961))). 
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led some to accuse judges of raising new issues when doing so accords 
with their personal preferences.68 
3. Questions Presented.  In addition to judges’ willingness to raise 
new legal claims and arguments on their own motion, federal courts 
have also adopted a number of procedural rules and practices at odds 
with the party presentation rule. For example, the Supreme Court has 
long assumed the power to amend or add to the questions presented 
by the parties for resolution. Frequently, the Court rewrites those 
questions to clarify, narrow, or simplify the issues framed by the 
parties. On occasion, the Court has even made substantive changes to 
the issues the parties ask it to review, or has added entirely new 
questions.69 
The Supreme Court has never reconciled its habit of adding to 
the questions raised by the parties with the norm of party 
presentation. Moreover, the practice is also at odds with Supreme 
Court Rule 14(1)(a), which provides: “Only the questions set out in 
the petition, or fairly included therein, will be considered by the 
Court.” Although the Court acknowledges that “we ordinarily do not 
consider questions outside those presented in the petition for 
certiorari,” it has gone on to describe that practice as “prudential,” 
and thus one that can be “disregard[ed]” in “exceptional cases,” when 
“reasons of urgency or of economy” justify doing so.70 In short, the 
 
 68. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 19, at 302 (“[I]n Dickerson, the Fourth Circuit 
invoked § 3501 over the objections of the parties precisely because it wanted to reach a 
particular result: upholding its constitutionality.”); Barry A. Miller, Sua Sponte Appellate 
Rulings: When Courts Deprive Litigants of an Opportunity to Be Heard, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
1253, 1256–58, 1260 (2002) (“The absence of a consistent principle [for raising issues sua sponte] 
leaves courts open to the accusation that ignoring the adversary process is a political action, 
where a court reaches out to legislate instead of following judicial norms.”). 
 69. See, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 535 (1992) (noting that the Court has 
“on occasion rephrased the question presented by a petitioner or requested the parties to 
address an important question of law not raised in the petition for certiorari”); Payne v. 
Tennessee, 498 U.S. 1080, 1080 (1991) (granting the certiorari petition and “request[ing]” that 
the parties “brief and argue whether Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), and South 
Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), should be overruled”); Patterson v. McLean Credit 
Union, 485 U.S. 617, 617 (1988) (ordering the parties to address whether 42 U.S.C. § 1981 
affords a remedy against private employers); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 408 U.S. 921, 921 
(1972) (ordering the parties to brief an additional question); Neely v. Strubs Constr. Co., 382 
U.S. 914, 914 (1965) (granting the certiorari petition and asking the parties to address whether 
the appellate court’s power pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 and the Court’s own 
precedent to issue a judgment notwithstanding the verdict justified the ruling below). 
 70. Yee, 503 U.S. at 535 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481 n.15 (1976)). In 
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971), the 
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Court has retained seemingly standardless discretion to violate the 
norm of party presentation whenever it wishes to do so. 
4. Amicus Curiae.  The widespread participation of amicus curiae 
at all stages of litigation is also in tension with the party presentation 
principle.71 Although many amicus briefs simply underscore the 
petitioners’ and respondents’ arguments, some stake out new 
territory, and no rule forbids them from doing so. To the contrary, the 
rules of procedure governing amicus filings in the U.S. Supreme 
Court state that amicus briefs should discuss aspects of the case given 
short shrift or entirely overlooked by the parties, and discourage 
amicus briefs that simply reiterate the litigants’ arguments.72 
Studies have shown that amicus briefs filed in the Supreme Court 
are effective, in that they increase the chances of the Court granting 
certiorari and improve the likelihood of success on the merits.73 
Furthermore, and of relevance to this Article, their value comes not 
just from the show of support but from the new arguments and 
information they provide to the Court in favor of one party or the 
other. Political scientist Paul Collins devised a study to determine 
whether the value of amicus briefs came from the number of people 
supporting a position, or whether judges gained additional legal and 
factual material from these briefs that assisted them in reaching a 
 
Supreme Court stated that the rule “does not limit our power to decide important questions not 
raised by the parties,” and went on to describe “well-recognized exceptions” to the rule. Id. at 
320 n.6. 
 71. Linda Sandstrom Simard, An Empirical Study of Amici Curiae in Federal Court: A Fine 
Balance of Access, Efficiency, and Adversarialism, 27 REV. LITIG. 669, 671 (2008) (reporting 
that amicus participation in the Supreme Court increased 800 percent during the last half of the 
twentieth century); John Harrington, Note, Amici Curiae in the Federal Courts of Appeals: How 
Friendly Are They?, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 667, 680 (2005) (reporting that amicus 
participation in the courts of appeals increased 14.6 percent from 1992 through 2002). 
 72. See SUP. CT. R. 37.1; see also Simard, supra note 71, at 691 (noting that “amici are 
criticized if they merely duplicate the information presented by the parties”). In the words of 
Supreme Court Rule 37.1: “An amicus curiae brief that brings to the attention of the Court 
relevant matter not already brought to its attention by the parties may be of considerable help 
to the Court. An amicus curiae brief that does not serve this purpose burdens the Court, and its 
filing is not favored.” SUP. CT. R. 37.1. 
 73. Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the 
U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109, 1122 (1988) (“[T]he addition of just one 
amicus curiae brief in support of certiorari increases the likelihood of plenary review by 40%–
50%.”); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the 
Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 830 (2000). 
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decision, and concluded that they were effective for both reasons.74 
Another recent article summarizing a nationwide survey of federal 
judges concluded that “judges at all three levels of the federal bench 
find amici curiae helpful in offering new legal arguments that are 
absent from the parties’ briefs,” though the author was careful to note 
that amici “may not stray too far from the agenda as set by the 
parties.”75 
So it is not surprising that the Supreme Court has based some of 
its most important holdings on arguments raised only in amicus briefs. 
In Teague v. Lane,76 the Court addressed the retroactivity of the 
petitioner’s Sixth Amendment claim on habeas review, even though 
that issue was raised only in an amicus brief.77 Likewise, the parties in 
Mapp v. Ohio78 did not argue that the Fourth Amendment’s 
exclusionary rule should apply to the states, and yet the Court 
adopted that argument after noting that it had been raised in an 
amicus brief.79 More recently, in Romer v. Evans,80 the Court struck 
down an amendment to the Colorado state constitution that 
prohibited legal protections for gay people, relying on the arguments 
in an amicus brief by Professor Laurence Tribe.81 
Most remarkable in light of the party presentation norm, the 
Supreme Court occasionally appoints amicus curiae to argue a 
position that no party to the case supports, even when those issues are 
not jurisdictional. For example, in Bob Jones University v. United 
States,82 the Supreme Court appointed William Coleman as amicus 
curiae to argue that institutions that discriminate on the basis of race 
are not entitled to tax-exempt status after the United States 
abandoned that position.83 More recently, in Irizarry v. United States,84 
 
 74. Paul M. Collins Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae 
Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 807 passim (2004). 
 75. Simard, supra note 71, at 690–92. 
 76. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
 77. Id. at 300. 
 78. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 79. Id. at 646 n.3. 
 80. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 81. Kenji Yoshino, Tribe, 42 TULSA L. REV. 961, 966 (2007). 
 82. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
 83. Goldsboro Christian Schs., Inc. v. United States, 456 U.S. 922, 922 (1982) (“William T. 
Coleman, Jr., Esquire, of Washington, D.C., a member of the Bar of this Court, is invited to 
brief and argue [this case and Bob Jones University], as amicus curiae in support of the 
judgments below.”). 
 84. Irizarry v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2198 (2008). 
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the Court assigned Professor Peter Rutledge to defend the Eleventh 
Circuit’s decision holding that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
32(h) does not require that a trial court give notice in advance of 
imposing a criminal sentence that departs from the sentencing 
guidelines after both the United States and the defendant agreed that 
such notice must be provided.85 
Relying on arguments made by amici is a clear transgression of 
the norm of party presentation, but it cannot be described as 
straightforward judicial issue creation. Judges who turn to amici are 
not setting their own agenda, as judges who raise issues sua sponte 
can be accused of doing. Furthermore, the parties may respond to 
arguments by amici, and thus provide the judge with an adversarial 
exchange on the new issues raised. Even though participation by 
amici is not equivalent to judicial issue creation, the prevalence of 
amicus participation nonetheless emphasizes the shaky foundation of 
the party presentation norm. 
C. Issue Creation in Practice 
Below are descriptions of a few significant cases in which the 
Supreme Court has raised an issue that went unmentioned by the 
parties. Part II will return to these examples to illustrate the 
rationales supporting judicial issue creation. 
1. Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.  Erie Railroad v. Tompkins has 
long been considered one of the most important cases in American 
legal history for its holding that federal courts lack the power to 
create federal common law—a question that the parties never raised.86 
Erie Railroad was sued by Tompkins, a pedestrian injured by a 
passing train while walking near Erie’s railroad tracks in 
Pennsylvania. The railroad’s liability turned on whether Tompkins 
was to be treated as a licensee, in which case the railroad would be 
liable for its negligence, or whether he was a trespasser to whom the 
railroad could be liable only if its conduct amounted to “wanton or 
willful” negligence. Tompkins argued that under the precedent of 
Swift v. Tyson, the federal court must develop its own common law 
 
 85. Id. at 2202. 
 86. See, e.g., CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 
378 (6th ed. 2002) (“It is impossible to overstate the importance of the Erie decision.” (footnote 
omitted)); Justice Hugo Black, Address at the Sixty-Second Annual Meeting of the Missouri 
Bar Association (Sept. 25, 1942), in 13 MO. B.J. 173, 174 (1942) (declaring Erie “one of the most 
important cases at law in American legal history”). 
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rule regarding the appropriate standard of care, and urged the Court 
to consider Tompkins a licensee. The railroad did not question the 
holding in Swift v. Tyson, and thus did not contest the federal courts’ 
power to create federal general common law. Instead, the railroad 
made the narrower claim that Swift applied only when the relevant 
state court had yet to speak clearly on the matter. Because 
Pennsylvania state courts had held that a railroad owed no duty of 
care to a pedestrian using a path near the railroad, the railroad 
claimed that the federal court must adopt this standard. Even though 
neither party questioned the validity of Swift, the Court overturned 
that precedent and ruled that federal courts sitting in diversity 
jurisdiction had no power to create “federal general common law” 
and must instead apply the common law rules of the relevant state.87 
2. Washington v. Davis.  In Washington v. Davis, a group of 
unsuccessful African-American applicants for positions on the police 
force in Washington, D.C., sued the city, claiming that a written 
personnel test administered as part of the application process 
disproportionately excluded blacks but had no relationship to job 
performance, and therefore violated the Constitution’s Equal 
Protection Clause. The plaintiffs did not claim that they were victims 
of intentional discrimination, but argued instead that the Equal 
Protection Clause prohibits government conduct that has a disparate 
impact based on race. The defendant agreed that the plaintiffs could 
prevail on their constitutional claim without demonstrating that the 
defendant was motivated by discriminatory animus, but argued that 
the personnel test was related to job performance and thus was 
permissible despite its disparate impact on black applicants. Despite 
the defendant’s concession, the Supreme Court held that the Equal 
Protection Clause prohibited only intentional discrimination, not 
conduct having a disparate impact based on race.88 
3. Dickerson v. United States.  Judicial power to raise a new legal 
claim sua sponte came up most recently in Dickerson v. United States. 
The government had appealed from a district court decision granting 
Charles Dickerson’s motion to suppress his confession on the ground 
that he had not been read his Miranda rights. Although a federal 
statute enacted in 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 3501, purported to override 
 
 87. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78–80 (1938). 
 88. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238–39 (1976). 
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Miranda and set a more lenient standard for the admission of 
confessions, the government had a longstanding policy of refusing to 
rely on the statute, believing it to be unconstitutional, and thus 
argued only that Dickerson’s confession should be admitted against 
him because he had waived his Miranda rights before confessing.89 
The Fourth Circuit nonetheless raised the statute sua sponte, 
concluding that it was obligated to determine whether § 3501 
displaced Miranda despite the parties’ refusal to brief and argue the 
question. The panel then held that the statute was constitutional, and 
thus that Dickerson’s confession should be admitted without regard 
to whether he had been read his rights. The Supreme Court 
appointed an amicus to argue in favor of the Fourth Circuit’s 
decision, and then reversed without addressing whether the lower 
court should have raised the statute on its own motion. 
These are just three prominent examples of judicial issue 
creation among many instances. Even though judges widely agree 
that they should decide cases as framed by the parties, these cases 
demonstrate that they are also willing to raise new issues when they 
believe that litigants have mischaracterized the law they have asked 
the courts to apply.90 These cases carve out important exceptions to 
the norm of party presentation, but there has been little attempt by 
courts and commentators to articulate a theory of judicial power that 
justifies deviation from the norm. 
 
 89. The United States had raised 18 U.S.C. § 3501 in the district court, but then had 
abandoned the argument in accordance with the United States Department of Justice’s 
longstanding policy of refusing to rely on the statute for the admission of confessions. See 
Devins, supra note 19, at 252 n.6 (citing Pretrial Rehearing Brief for the United States at 2 n.1, 
United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999)). 
 90. See, e.g., U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., 508 U.S. 439, 445–48 
(1993) (stating that a court may raise sua sponte an issue that is “antecedent to . . . and 
ultimately dispositive of” the dispute before it because litigants cannot “extract the opinion of a 
court on hypothetical Acts of Congress or dubious constitutional principles” simply by 
stipulating as to matters of law that are not in fact certain); Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 
500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991) (“When an issue or claim is properly before the court, the court is not 
limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the 
independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law.”); United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905 (1984) (noting that even though the United States had not 
asked the Court to review the lower court’s determination that probable cause was absent, it 
nonetheless had the “power” to decide the case on this ground if it wished to do so). 
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II.  DEFENDING JUDICIAL ISSUE CREATION 
Lacking a clear rationale, judicial issue creation is widely viewed 
as judicial overreaching. Those few scholars who have noted the 
dichotomy between rhetoric and practice depict judges who raise new 
issues as “policy entrepreneurs,” and express concern that issue 
creation erodes the distinction between judicial and legislative 
power.91 And when the practice occasionally comes to the attention of 
the popular press—such as it did in Dickerson v. United States—
judges are criticized for overstepping their role to further their 
ideological agendas.92 
Although this criticism is to be expected, at least in some cases it 
is misplaced. Concededly, the norm against issue creation is an 
important limit on judicial power that should be honored in the 
typical case. But condemning judicial issue creation as equivalent to 
legislating from the bench ignores the many valid reasons why courts 
raise issues that have been overlooked or ignored by the parties, as 
well as the ways in which issue creation can serve to limit, rather than 
expand, judicial power. This Part defends the occasional use of 
judicial issue creation as an essential tool with which the courts can 
protect the integrity of judicial decisionmaking and the law itself. 
A. Issue Creation and the Judicial Power to “Say What the Law Is” 
Article III has very little to say about how federal courts should 
go about deciding cases.93 Nonetheless, some basic principles derived 
from the content of that article, as well as from the structure of 
government created by the Constitution as a whole, support judicial 
power to craft new legal claims and arguments in some cases. 
First, it is long established that federal courts have the power to 
“say what the law is,” and thus must be able to take notice of legal 
 
 91. Kevin T. McGuirre & Barbara Palmer, Issue Fluidity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 89 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 691, 699 (1995). 
 92. See, e.g., Devins, supra note 19, at 252 & n.12 (citing articles criticizing the Fourth 
Circuit for sua sponte raising a new issue in Dickerson). 
 93. Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial 
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1877–78 (2001) (“Article III invokes but does not define the 
‘judicial Power.’ Nor does it specify which procedures federal courts should use to decide cases 
or controversies.” (footnote omitted)); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The 
Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1364 (1973) (stating that Article III “is itself spare and 
unhelpful” on the meaning of judicial power); Adrian Vermeule, Essay, Judicial History, 108 
YALE L.J. 1311, 1335 (1999) (“Article III . . . says nothing about the procedures by which courts 
vested with the judicial power must or may consider and decide cases . . . .”). 
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sources, arguments, and claims omitted by the parties when necessary 
to avoid issuing inaccurate or incomplete statements of law. Second, 
as a related matter, courts must retain control of the interpretive 
process and thus cannot cede to the parties the sources and 
arguments that will be used to interpret statutory or constitutional 
texts, particularly when doing so could expand the judicial role 
beyond its constitutional parameters. And third, the Constitution 
guarantees federal judges life tenure and salary protection to ensure 
that they can issue pronouncements on legal questions without 
interference from the political branches or the public. An inflexible 
norm against party presentation would threaten this judicial 
independence by giving the parties, and not the courts, control over 
judicial pronouncements. 
1. Law Pronouncement.  Since Marbury v. Madison,94 federal 
courts have the recognized authority to “say what the law is.”95 That 
phrase is usually cited in support of the judiciary’s power to strike 
down state and federal laws that conflict with the federal 
Constitution.96 But federal judges are responsible for establishing the 
meaning of contested law, not simply invalidating it, and this is the 
task that occupies far more of their time. If two parties with a stake in 
the matter disagree over the interpretation of a statute, regulation, or 
constitutional provision, courts resolve that conflict by publicly 
stating not only who wins the case but also what the law means.97 
Locating the answer to disputed questions of law is one of the 
federal judiciary’s essential functions. Although Congress and the 
president take the lead by enacting statutes and promulgating 
regulations, their formal role in establishing the meaning of law ends 
when courts are asked to determine how a law passed by the political 
branches applies to a specific case or controversy. Members of 
 
 94. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 95. Id. at 177. 
 96. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Marbury and the Constitutional Mind: A Bicentennial Essay on 
the Wages of Doctrinal Tension, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1, 5 (2003) (“Marbury not only represents the 
fountainhead of judicial review, but also furnishes the canonical statement of the necessary and 
appropriate role of courts in the constitutional scheme.”). 
 97. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (“[Marbury] declared the basic principle that 
the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that 
principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and 
indispensable feature of our constitutional system. It follows that the interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the 
land . . . .”). 
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Congress may file amicus briefs or publish postenactment legislative 
history, but those statements customarily are given no more weight 
than any other party’s opinion.98 Judicial decisions are not open to 
revision either by Congress or the president, no matter how strongly 
the political branches disagree with courts’ conclusions about the 
meaning of law.99 The political branches can, of course, override a 
judicial decision with which they disagree through the constitutional 
mechanisms for enacting new law. Unless and until they do so, 
however, judicial pronouncements are the law for all the citizens to 
follow. 
When the parties fail to fully and accurately describe applicable 
legal standards, the norm against judicial issue creation comes into 
conflict with the judiciary’s law pronouncement power. Because 
judicial decisions are objective statements about the meaning of law, 
not statements about how the parties subjectively interpret the law, 
courts must be able to take notice of legal arguments that the parties 
fail to see. If litigants could constrain courts through their own 
truncated or inaccurate depictions of the meaning of statutes, 
constitutional provisions, and the like, they could effectively wrest 
this task away from the courts, putting federal judges in the 
impoverished role of picking and choosing from among the litigants’ 
interpretations of the law, rather than their own.100 
 
 98. See, e.g., Cobell v. Norton, 428 F.3d 1070, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[P]ost-enactment 
legislative history is . . . entitled to little weight.”). 
 99. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, 514 U.S. 211, 218–19 (1995) (holding that Congress cannot 
revise final judgments by Article III courts); Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 (1792) 
(holding that the executive branch cannot revise judgments by Article III courts). 
 100. Some scholars contend that the Supreme Court has already transferred the judicial 
branch’s exclusive authority to interpret law to the executive branch by establishing Chevron 
deference. Under Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), courts 
must defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguities in the statutes they administer 
even when the judges themselves would have reached a different conclusion, id. at 845, leading 
some scholars to characterize Chevron as the “counter-Marbury for the administrative state.” 
Cass Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 
2580, 2589 (2006). 
  Chevron grants the executive branch, through agencies, a great deal of authority over 
what had once been solely the judiciary’s domain. But Chevron deference is highly constrained. 
Deference is granted only when agencies are interpreting a statute that Congress has assigned 
them to administer, and only after a court finds that the statute is ambiguous and the agency’s 
interpretation is reasonable. Most important for the discussion here, agency interpretations will 
be awarded deference only when announced through formal procedures, such as notice-and-
comment rulemaking and formal adjudication, rather than through informal channels such as 
letters, guidance documents, or briefs. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 
(2001). Applied under these conditions, Chevron deference is justified on the grounds that 
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Some of the exceptions to the party presentation rule discussed 
in Part I.B can be understood as judicial efforts to avoid issuing 
erroneous statements of law, though the courts did not describe them 
this way. By the time Erie reached the Supreme Court, a majority of 
Justices had concluded that federal courts lacked statutory and 
constitutional authority to craft federal common law. The Court thus 
chose to sua sponte overrule Swift v. Tyson rather than continue to 
apply its misguided precedent. Likewise, in Washington v. Davis, the 
Court disagreed with the parties’ assumption that the Equal 
Protection Clause prohibited disparate treatment even in the absence 
of an intent to discriminate, and thus was forced to raise the issue on 
its own motion rather than decide the case on the parties’ terms. 
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit applied 18 U.S.C. § 3501 sua sponte in 
Dickerson v. United States because it believed (mistakenly) that the 
statute provided the correct standard for determining the 
admissibility of confessions. In all of these cases, courts were faced 
with a dilemma: The court could either decide the case on the parties’ 
terms, applying the law in accordance with the parties’ inaccurate 
representations, or it could raise sua sponte what it believed to be the 
correct legal standard. 
Admittedly, the courts could have issued decisions in these cases 
in accordance with the parties’ view of the law, but then could have 
noted that the parties had failed to raise key issues that might have 
produced a different holding. Judges regularly insert such 
qualifications into their decisions to avoid establishing precedent on a 
question not fully briefed by the parties, and perhaps to signal to 
future litigants to be sure to argue the point. Such qualifications put 
those who read the decision on notice that the court’s view of the law 
 
Congress has delegated to agencies the authority to fill gaps in ambiguous statutes, and that the 
combination of agency expertise and political accountability makes them better suited than 
courts to do so. 
  Therefore, however much a step back Chevron takes from Marbury, it does not suggest 
that the scope of judicial decisions can be limited by the parties’ interpretation of the law. To 
the contrary, the carefully crafted constraints on Chevron deference expose the flaws in an 
unyielding rule in favor of party presentation. Such a rule would require courts to adopt 
interpretations proposed by parties who have not been delegated interpretive authority by 
Congress, who have no claim to expertise or public accountability, and who cannot demonstrate 
that their views have been vetted through formal deliberative procedures. Indeed, it would be 
extremely odd if courts were required to adopt legal positions agreed upon by parties to 
litigation even as the courts were prohibited from deferring to agency interpretation that did 
meet all the requirements of Chevron and its progeny. This practice cannot be squared with the 
judiciary’s constitutional role to state the meaning of contested federal law. 
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might change in a future case, and thus alleviates some of the harm 
that would arise from inadequate party presentations.101 
However, issuing this type of qualified opinion—a one-shot, 
nonprecedential statement about the law that applies to one set of 
litigants only—is not a satisfying solution to the problem. When a 
court couches its opinion in such tentative terms, it has abandoned its 
law-pronouncement function in favor of resolving the dispute on the 
parties’ terms. While this may be the best solution in some cases, it 
should not be viewed as the only option available to courts facing this 
problem. If it were, parties could regularly force courts to decide 
cases on grounds of the parties’ invention that are at odds with 
existing law, in the form of decisions that apply only to the parties. In 
short, the parties would transform the federal courts from the third 
branch of government responsible for declaring the meaning of law 
into a private arbitration service working for the parties and no one 
else.102 To retain their role in the constitutional structure, judges must 
have the ability to raise new issues when failing to do so would result 
in an inaccurate statement of the law that applies solely to the parties 
before the court. 
Critics of issue creation would likely argue that the judiciary’s 
law-pronouncement function should not be given priority over 
competing values. They would agree that courts should of course 
strive to get the law right, but they would note that this goal is often 
trumped by various institutional limits on judicial power. For 
example, illegal conduct goes uncorrected anytime a party fails to 
bring a lawsuit challenging the erroneous application of law, or is 
barred from doing so by constitutional or prudential limits on federal 
jurisdiction. Furthermore, a number of judicial doctrines—such as 
stare decisis, law of the case, res judicata, and the requirement that 
lower courts adhere to superior court precedent—require judges to 
accept flawed legal determinations and incorporate them into current 
decisions.103 Finally, the waiver doctrine, which bars a party from 
 
 101. See, e.g., Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 100 n.5 (1991) (stating that 
when the parties fail to fully and accurately describe the law, courts should be careful to avoid 
“issuing an opinion that could reasonably be understood by lower courts and nonparties to 
establish binding circuit precedent on the issue decided”). 
 102. See, e.g., Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in 
the United States, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435 passim (2004) (criticizing unpublished decisions on 
these grounds). 
 103. Stare decisis is the judicial policy in favor of adhering to past precedent. Law of the 
case is the principle followed by appellate courts of refusing to alter a previous appellate 
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raising a new argument on appeal, suggests that courts are willing to 
place administrative concerns such as finality above accuracy in legal 
decisionmaking. These rules all suggest that getting the law right 
sometimes takes a back seat to other priorities.104 
Aside from the doctrine of waiver, however, none of these rules 
of practice requires courts to base their decisions on erroneous 
statements of law by nonjudicial actors, and thus do not pose the 
same threat to judicial power. For example, if an illegal practice is 
never challenged in court, then the judiciary is never put in the 
position of having to sanction that conduct. Judicial inaction simply 
does not raise the same concerns as judicial decisions premised on 
inaccurate statements of the law. 
Likewise, although doctrines such as stare decisis, res judicata, 
and law of the case may require a court to affirm what it believes to 
be an incorrect statement of the law, the source of the flawed legal 
analysis in such cases is another court, not a nonjudicial actor. Thus, 
these doctrines do not deprive courts of their control over law 
pronouncement. Allowing the first-in-time decision to stand seems 
reasonable as a matter of policy because it allows citizens to rely on 
the first judicial pronouncement on a question of law, but does so 
without undermining the authority of the judicial branch.105 In 
contrast, if courts were forced to decide cases based on the parties’ 
inaccurate descriptions of the law, these non-judicial actors could co-
opt courts into issuing decisions affirming their erroneous view of the 
law.106 
 
determination made in the same case in an earlier appeal. Res judicata is the policy that a final 
judgment rendered by a court with competent jurisdiction is conclusive on the questions 
involved between the parties and their privies. All three doctrines thus require, or at least 
strongly encourage, courts to adhere to previous decisions with which they may disagree. 
 104. See, e.g., LANDSMAN, supra note 43, at 34–37 (stating that none of the faults attributed 
to the adversarial system are so serious as to warrant the abandonment of adversary procedure). 
 105. Furthermore, it is worth noting that stare decisis is not an unyielding doctrine. If a 
reviewing court concludes that a prior decision is truly wrong, it has the power to overrule that 
precedent. And if a lower court believes that an intervening line of Supreme Court cases or a 
new Act of Congress overrules a higher court’s earlier ruling, then it can refuse to follow what it 
concludes is a now-defunct precedent. Thus, these doctrines will give way at times to the need 
for accurate legal opinions. 
 106. There are additional good reasons to require lower court obeisance to the decisions 
reached by reviewing courts. Our hierarchical federal court system is premised, in large part, on 
the assumption that higher courts are more likely to get the law right. Higher courts sit in 
multijudge panels that allow for the benefit of deliberation and discussion; these courts have 
more time to decide each case; and these judges are (supposedly) superior legal intellects. See 
Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Lower Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. 
REV. 817, 837–49 (1994). 
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Admittedly, the doctrine of waiver is closely related to the party 
presentation rule, in that it appears to sacrifice accuracy in legal 
opinions for the benefits of finality. Appellate courts regularly declare 
that new claims and even new legal arguments raised for the first time 
on appeal are waived, regardless of their merits, resulting in judicial 
opinions that do not address a relevant question of law. One 
important purpose of the waiver rule is to prevent parties from raising 
arguments at the appellate stage that require development of new 
facts not already in the record. Remanding for a new round of 
discovery would be time consuming, and deciding the case without a 
full record on the issue would be unfair to both parties. Thus, for 
purposes of judicial economy and to avoid prejudice, courts apply the 
waiver rule to bar new arguments that require factual development 
on appeal. 
A strictly applied rule of waiver, like a strictly applied rule of 
party presentation, sacrifices accuracy in judicial decisionmaking, 
potentially undermining the courts’ law-pronouncement function. 
Thus, the arguments presented here in favor of judicial issue creation 
would also support a relaxation of the waiver doctrine. It is not 
surprising, then, that just as courts violate the party presentation rule 
to avoid issuing inaccurate statements of law, they are also willing to 
overlook waiver when the new argument goes to the heart of the 
claims on which they must rule. Courts apply waiver stringently when 
the parties come up with a whole new legal claim or theory. But when 
the new argument recharacterizes an existing claim or adds new 
sources or a new spin on an existing argument, courts are less rigid in 
their application of that rule. This Article suggests that courts have 
good reasons to relax the waiver doctrine, just as they should make 
exceptions to the party presentation rule, when failing to do so would 
undermine their law-pronouncement function. 
2. The Interpretive Process.  Courts not only have the power to 
declare the meaning of law; they also have the discretion to choose 
how to interpret it. Neither task should be taken over by nonjudicial 
actors. To maintain control over the interpretive process, judges must 
step in at times and add to or alter the parties’ arguments. 
Of course, there is no single accepted method of interpretation. 
When asked to determine the meaning of a provision of the United 
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States Constitution, some judges approach the task as textualists,107 
others as originalists,108 and some as proponents of a “living 
Constitution.”109 When it comes to interpreting statutes, judges differ 
over whether to look to the intentions of the legislature and the 
broader purpose of the legislative enactment, or to limit their analysis 
to the statute’s plain language. Judges disagree over when and 
whether to apply countless canons of construction, in part because 
these canons embody policy choices and “reflect constitutionally 
inspired values”110 over which they also part ways.111 Each judge has 
the authority to employ the interpretive approach she thinks is best. 
Academics debate the degree to which Congress could enact 
legislation that purported to control the judiciary’s interpretive 
methodology, especially its interpretation of legislative enactments. 
Some argue that Congress has significant leeway to tell the courts 
how to interpret its statutes, while others contend that the 
Constitution prohibits legislative interference in the judicial process.112 
 
 107. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Heller & Originalism’s Dead Hand—In Theory and Practice, 
56 UCLA L. REV. 1399, 1409 (2009) (quoting an interview in which Justice Scalia stated that he 
is a textualist). 
 108. See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s 
Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 562–68 (2006) (discussing and criticizing 
originalism). 
 109. See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 
693, 695 (1976) (discussing the interpretive philosophy premised on the idea of a “living 
Constitution”). 
 110. Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory 
Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 652 n.308 (1995); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & 
Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional 
Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 599 (1992) (noting that courts attempt to construct 
congressional acts so as to avoid constitutional questions). 
 111. The Court’s presumption against the preemption of state law, for example, is rooted in 
respect for state sovereignty. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (“So 
we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be 
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”). 
The rule of lenity, which requires a court to give a criminal defendant the benefit of any 
ambiguity within a statutory text, is a quasi-constitutionally based rule of construction derived 
from the notion that citizens must be given fair warning before they can be punished and that 
Congress, not courts, should make the moral judgments behind criminal sanctions. William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441, 1475 (2008). The 
absurdity doctrine enables even textualists to deviate from the plain language of a statute if such 
a reading would produce an absurd result. See, e.g., John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2419 (2003) (noting that the absurdity doctrine is viewed as a 
“qualification to textual interpretation”). 
 112. Compare Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2088 (2002) (arguing that Congress has the authority to create federal 
rules of statutory interpretation), and John Harrison, Essay, The Power of Congress over the 
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The issue is complicated, and the answer likely depends on whether 
Congress is using control over interpretation to further its role as 
policymaker, or whether it is seeking to manipulate judicial power 
and displace the judiciary’s interpretive function (and that is a hard 
line to draw). But whatever one’s views on Congress’s power over 
judicial interpretation, the claim here is that litigants cannot 
manipulate the interpretive process through their litigation choices. 
Accordingly, if two committed textualist litigants present their 
divergent views of the plain meaning of a statutory text to an 
intentionalist judge, that judge can explore the legislative history and 
issue a decision that turns on that history.113 That proposition is 
relatively uncontroversial, because there is no new issue created here, 
and thus no transgression of the norm against judicial issue creation. 
But what if the litigants fail to argue that the court must go beyond 
the plain text of the statute to avoid an absurd result? Or neglect to 
cite another provision of the statute containing similar language that 
sheds light on the disputed provision?114 Or refuse to argue that the 
court adopt an interpretation that would avoid a constitutional 
question?115 The answer must be that the party presentation principle 
gives way when the litigants’ interpretive philosophy differs from that 
of the judge, for otherwise litigants could force judges to apply the 
interpretive methodology that the litigants prefer. 
Concededly, the issue rarely arises because litigants typically 
adopt any interpretive philosophy that allows them to prevail, and 
will usually claim they win under alternative readings of a statute. A 
plaintiff challenging the government’s interpretation of a statute 
would likely argue that the statute’s text clearly supports her position, 
and that the legislative history confirms the text, and that various 
canons of construction support the plaintiff’s reading. But 
occasionally litigants will neglect an important line of reasoning, 
 
Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 503, 505 (2000) (arguing that Congress can abrogate stare 
decisis), with Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of Judicial 
Decision-Making, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 194–95 (2001) (asserting that “Congress does not 
have the power to tell the federal courts how to go about their business of deciding cases”). 
 113. See, e.g., Phillips/May Corp. v. United States, 524 F.3d 1264, 1270 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(noting that neither party cited legislative history that the court found dispositive of a legal 
question in the case). 
 114. Cf. United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier, 380 F.3d 488, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
(noting that the court has the authority to remedy errors sua sponte when the parties’ failure to 
plead a particular issue seriously affects “the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings”). 
 115. See, e.g., Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454, 457 (1960). 
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either through oversight or due to their litigation agenda. For 
example, in Gonzales v. Carhart,116 Planned Parenthood Federation of 
America chose not to argue that the partial birth abortion statute was 
an unconstitutional regulation of interstate commerce even though 
that argument would have appealed to at least a few Justices, 
presumably because Planned Parenthood disagreed with that 
conclusion as a matter of both law and policy.117 Institutional litigants, 
including the federal government, will avoid citing and relying on 
doctrines they dislike and lines of precedent they hope will be 
overturned. In such cases, judges should have the discretion to go 
beyond the arguments in the parties’ briefs, because failure to do so 
would let litigants control an essential aspect of the judicial function. 
The problem is particularly acute when parties fail to adhere to 
the constitutional avoidance doctrine, which requires that judges 
adopt conservative interpretations of statutes and regulations to steer 
well clear of constitutional lines. The doctrine serves important 
institutional interests: it ensures that courts do not needlessly strike 
down legislative enactments, allowing judges to evade conflict with 
the other branches of government; it leads to interpretations that best 
accord with Congress’s intentions, since Congress presumably does 
not wish to enact constitutionally suspect legislation; and it enables 
courts to avoid issuing near-immutable pronouncements on the 
meaning of the Constitution.118 
Litigants will not always share the judiciary’s interest in 
promoting the values underlying the constitutional avoidance 
doctrine, however. If a litigant prefers the constitutionally suspect 
interpretation, then that party has no incentive to argue for the 
alternative, constitutionally sound construction. Indeed, sometimes 
litigants turn to the courts precisely because they distrust the political 
branches and believe that their interests can best be served by 
independent judges, who they hope will declare the scope of their 
constitutional rights in the broadest possible terms. Nor will litigants 
have any particular interest in avoiding conflict between the courts 
 
 116. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007). 
 117. See, e.g., id. at 1640 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I also note that whether the Act 
constitutes a permissible exercise of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause is not before 
the Court. The parties did not raise or brief that issue; it is outside the question presented; and 
the lower courts did not address it.”). 
 118. See Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1202–08 (2006) (describing the rationales for the constitutional avoidance 
canon). But see id. at 1208–09 (critiquing the rationales for the constitutional avoidance canon). 
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and the political branches, or in cabining judicial decisions about the 
meaning of the Constitution.119 For all of these reasons, sometimes no 
party will argue in favor of the most constitutionally conservative 
interpretation, forcing judges to do so on their own motion. 
In the past, the Supreme Court has resolved cases on grounds 
outside the questions presented to avoid a constitutional issue, though 
usually without providing much explanation for doing so. For 
example, in Boynton v. Commonwealth of Virginia,120 the Court 
agreed to hear the case of an African-American interstate bus 
passenger who was arrested after refusing to leave the whites-only 
section of a bus terminal restaurant. The petition presented two 
constitutional questions: “first, whether the conviction of petitioner 
[was] invalid as a burden on commerce in violation of Art. I, § 8, cl. 3 
of the Constitution; and second, whether the conviction violate[d] the 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”121 Writing for the majority, Justice Black admitted that 
“[o]rdinarily we limit our review to the questions presented in an 
application for certiorari,” but decided that it was “appropriate” for 
the Court to conclude that the discrimination against African-
American passengers violated the Interstate Commerce Act so as to 
avoid petitioner’s “two broad constitutional questions.”122 Likewise, in 
Neese v. Southern Railway Co.,123 the Supreme Court refused to 
decide whether an appellate court had jurisdiction to reverse a trial 
court’s denial of a motion for a new trial. The Court instead reversed 
the appellate court on the ground that, even assuming it had such 
power, its decision was an abuse of discretion.124 The Court explained: 
“We need not consider respondent’s contention that only the 
jurisdictional question was presented by the petition for certiorari” 
because “we follow the traditional practice of this Court of refusing to 
decide constitutional questions when the record discloses other 
grounds of decision, whether or not they have been properly raised 
before us by the parties.”125 
 
 119. Id. at 1220–21 (stating that the executive branch does not share the judiciary’s 
institutional limitations (such as its countermajoritarian status), and thus does not need to 
employ the constitutional avoidance canon in the same way a court would). 
 120. Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960). 
 121. Id. at 457. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Neese v. S. Ry. Co., 350 U.S. 77 (1955.) 
 124. Id. at 77. 
 125. Id. at 78. 
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As these examples demonstrate, issue creation can be a method 
by which courts constrain judicial power in response to litigants who 
would prefer to expand it. When judges inject new issues into 
litigation, they are often accused of acting as legislators—that is, of 
overstepping boundaries on judicial power to implement their 
personal ideological agenda.126 But ceding to the parties control over 
the issues presented in a case could just as easily undermine well-
established doctrines by which courts seek to limit the breadth of 
their decisions. In short, issue creation can be an act of judicial 
restraint. 
Likewise, the philosophy of judicial minimalism requires that 
judges be able to modify or supplement the parties’ arguments. 
Minimalists favor incremental steps over sweeping changes in legal 
norms because they fear that broadly worded decisions will 
undermine democratic processes, lead to unintended consequences, 
and put in place rigid rules that leave no flexibility for the future.127 
Minimalists advocate a profoundly modest role for the courts out of a 
belief that the political branches, and not the countermajoritarian 
courts, should make most of the important policy decisions for the 
country. 
At first glance, judicial issue creation appears to be the antithesis 
of minimalism. Allowing judges to transgress the limits of the parties’ 
arguments gives them the power to set their own agendas—a power 
normally reserved for the political branches. Judges might abuse that 
discretion by raising issues that are unnecessary to resolve the parties’ 
dispute, enabling them to engage in policymaking through advisory 
opinions. But judges might also raise new issues to narrow the scope 
of their decisions, thwarting litigants who would prefer a maximalist 
judicial decision over a minimalist one.128 In an era in which litigation, 
especially appellate litigation, can be as much about establishing 
precedent as resolving individual disputes, litigants may seek court 
 
 126. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 19, at 291; Milani & Smith, supra note 58, at 285–90; 
Miller, supra note 68, at 1256–58, 1261. 
 127. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON 
THE SUPREME COURT (1999) (describing the minimalist philosophy). 
 128. Here I disagree with Professor Chad Oldfather, who argues that if judges avoid broad, 
rule-based decisions, they can avoid the problem of going beyond parties’ arguments. Oldfather, 
supra note 22, at 137–38 & n.51. He assumes that deficiencies in the parties’ case presentation 
will prevent the court from adopting the appropriate broad rule of general application, but 
overlooks the possibility that the opposite problem will occur. That is, the parties might present 
only the broad-brush arguments to the courts, omitting case-specific claims that would narrow 
the scope of the court’s decision. 
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rulings on questions that could easily be avoided.129 Institutional 
litigants in particular may ask courts to pronounce on new questions 
of constitutional law, overturn long-established precedent, or make 
sweeping statements about the meaning of a statute or treaty, when a 
much narrower and less significant legal issue could resolve the case. 
The judiciary’s best method of narrowing decisions may be to alter 
the questions posed by the parties. 
3. Judicial Independence.  Article III courts can only 
meaningfully realize their power to “say what the law is” and to 
employ their preferred interpretive methods because they are 
insulated from political pressure by Article III’s life tenure and salary 
guarantees.130 These protections allow judges to issue decisions that 
conflict with the political branches’ preferences, or with public 
opinion, without fear of reprisal. Judicial decisions lack some of the 
legitimacy enjoyed by the political branches because federal judges 
are not elected, and thus not accountable, to the people subject to 
their rulings.131 By the same token, however, judicial articulations of 
the law have greater credibility than those of the political branches 
precisely because courts are not beholden to interest groups and 
other political actors.132 Whatever biases federal judges bring to the 
table, the public knows that their decisions are not crafted to curry 
favor with political parties or special interests.133 
 
 129. Cf. Frank B. Cross, In Praise of Irrational Plaintiffs, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 9–15 
(2000) (analyzing empirical evidence demonstrating that institutional litigants seek to 
manipulate precedent); id. at 22 (describing individual litigants’ “sociotropic goal of setting a 
precedent that would assist others who may be similarly situated future plaintiffs”); Marc 
Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97–103 (1974) (noting that repeat players are concerned about the 
effects of litigation beyond the immediate case). 
 130. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall 
hold their Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a 
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”). 
 131. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: 
The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 354 (1998) (describing the 
“countermajoritarian criticism” as “a challenge to the legitimacy or propriety of judicial review 
on the grounds that it is inconsistent with the will of the people, or a majority of the people, 
whose will, it is implied, should be sovereign in a democracy”). 
 132. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule 
of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 708 (1995) (“[T]he federal judiciary’s independence is widely 
thought to enhance its authority . . . .”). 
 133. The possibility of elevation to a higher court, however, could influence judicial 
decisions. Jonathan Remy Nash, Essay, Prejudging Judges, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2168, 2196 n.83 
(2006). 
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Judicial independence, and the respect for judicial 
decisionmaking that accompanies it, would be compromised if courts 
were required to rule on the law as it is presented to them, rather 
than as they believe it to be. Life tenure and salary protection ensure 
that federal judges cannot be threatened or coerced by litigants who 
want them to ignore specific statutes or interpret constitutional 
provisions as the litigants prefer. Yet litigants could accomplish the 
same result simply by omitting sources, claims, and arguments if 
courts were not free to raise overlooked statutes or adopt new 
interpretations of the law they are asked to apply. 
Furthermore, if judges are not permitted to question litigants’ 
articulation of the law, then courts can be co-opted by litigants 
seeking to benefit from the credibility of a judicial decision that 
describes the law as they see it. The cases discussed in Part I.B 
illustrate the point. For instance, a judicial decision in Dickerson v. 
United States discussing Miranda and not 18 U.S.C. § 3501 would have 
bestowed legitimacy on the executive’s claim that § 3501 did not 
displace Miranda, and yet the executive’s independent conclusion 
that § 3501 is unconstitutional would never have been tested. 
Likewise, in Washington v. Davis, the Court made clear that the 
Equal Protection Clause prohibited only intentional racial 
discrimination, and thereby avoided an opinion affirming the parties’ 
view that it applied to conduct having a disparate impact only. 
Granted, the Court could have issued decisions in each case stating 
explicitly that it was not deciding these issues because the parties had 
failed to raise them. But judges should have the discretion to object to 
the parties’ flawed descriptions of the law when failing to do so would 
put courts in a position of implicitly affirming the parties’ views. 
Were it otherwise, litigants could manipulate judicial power to 
obtain policy outcomes they desire without changing underlying legal 
standards—a result that courts forbid in other contexts. For example, 
although Congress has great latitude over federal jurisdiction, it 
would be on shaky ground if it attempted to strip federal courts of 
jurisdiction whenever it feared the court would issue a decision it did 
not like. Congress attempted something akin to this in a 
Reconstruction-era statute providing compensation for “loyal” 
southerners whose property had been seized by the Union during the 
Civil War. Courts began awarding compensation to southerners who 
had supported secession, but had subsequently been pardoned by 
President Lincoln. Unhappy with that result, Congress amended the 
statute to eliminate Supreme Court jurisdiction over any case in 
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which a former “rebel” asserted a presidential pardon as the basis for 
his claim for compensation. In United States v. Klein,134 the Supreme 
Court struck down that statute as unconstitutional.135 Although the 
Court’s reasoning was murky, some federal courts scholars have 
suggested that the real problem with the statute was that it was 
making a substantive policy choice (no compensation for pardoned 
southerners), but did so behind the guise of a policy-neutral 
jurisdictional question.136 Thus, Congress sought to benefit from 
judicial decisions denying southerners compensation without 
changing the substance of the federal policy.137 Likewise, when parties 
obtain judgments on manufactured questions of law, they acquire the 
approval of an apolitical, independent court for policy choices that 
were never enacted into law. 
The judiciary’s independence is also essential to avoid the 
concentration of lawmaking and law-exposition powers in the hands 
of one branch of government—a goal that could be undermined if 
courts never reframed issues presented by the executive branch acting 
as litigant.138 Members of the political branches know that judicial 
decisions may shape statutes, and thus these lawmakers are well 
aware that issues left unaddressed in legislation will be resolved by 
the independent courts, who may interpret statutes in ways these 
lawmakers dislike. The judiciary’s independence from these two 
branches guards against attempts by the political branches to control 
law at the back end—that is, when it is being applied to specific 
individuals. The political branches would be tempted to apply the law 
differently in cases in which it would be politically expedient to do so; 
 
 134. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 128 (1872). 
 135. Id. at 146–48. 
 136. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Christopher R. Pudelski, Legislative Deception, 
Separation of Powers, and the Democratic Process: Harnessing the Political Theory of United 
States v. Klein, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 450 (2006) (“The end result was that while the 
controlling substantive law purportedly remained the same, in reality the essence of that law 
had been effectively transformed into something very different.”). 
 137. Lawrence Sager stated the “first principle” of Klein as follows: “The judiciary will not 
allow itself to be made to speak and act against its own best judgment on matters within its 
competence which have great consequence for our political community. The judiciary will not 
permit its articulate authority to be subverted to serve ends antagonistic to its actual judgment; 
the judiciary will resist efforts to make it seem to support and regularize that with which it in 
fact disagrees.” Lawrence G. Sager, Klein’s First Principle: A Proposed Solution, 86 GEO. L.J. 
2525, 2529 (1998). 
 138. See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency 
Interpretation of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 645–54 (1996) (discussing the 
importance of the separation of lawmaking from law exposition). 
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only the judiciary is insulated from such pressures through its life 
tenure and salary protections. Judicial independence ensures that 
laws are applied fairly, and that like cases are treated alike (or at least 
not treated differently to curry political favor). The judiciary thus 
protects against the abuses that occur when the same branch of 
government has the power to both make the law and apply it in 
specific cases.139 
If courts were required to let the parties control case 
presentation, then the executive, acting as litigant, could adopt 
different interpretations of statutes and constitutional provisions in 
different cases. For example, the executive branch conceivably could 
choose whether to argue for admission of evidence under either 
Miranda or 18 U.S.C. § 3501, selecting one or the other depending on 
its preference in each case (until the statute was found 
unconstitutional, of course). Litigants could even rely on statutes that 
had been repealed, or seek the benefit of broader interpretations of 
constitutional rights than had been recognized, making case-by-case 
decisions as to which version of the law to present to the courts. Such 
cases are unusual, because normally one party or the other will assert 
the correct legal standard. But there are nonetheless plenty of cases 
on the books in which parties either inadvertently or intentionally 
omitted the relevant legal claim.140 Courts must have the power to 
prevent litigants—and in particular the executive branch—from 
picking and choosing their preferred legal interpretations on a case-
by-case basis. If courts did not have this authority, litigants could 
undermine the Framers’ intention to insulate law declaration from 
outside influence. 
B. Issue Creation and Limits on Government Power 
The Framers intended for the federal courts to enforce 
constitutional restrictions on governmental power. As Alexander 
Hamilton explained it, the 
complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential 
in a limited Constitution [because] . . . . [l]imitations of this kind can 
be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of 
 
 139. Cf. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 143, at 76 (C.B. MacPherson 
ed., 1980) (1690) (“[I]t may be too great a temptation to human frailty, apt to grasp at power for 
the same persons, who have the power of making laws, to have also in their hands the power to 
execute them, whereby they exempt themselves from obedience to the laws they make . . . .”). 
 140. See supra notes 3–17 and Part I.C. 
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courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to 
the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the 
reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to 
nothing.141 
To serve this purpose, courts must be free to take notice of 
constitutional transgressions by the government even when the 
litigants would prefer not to raise those issues. 
Of course, even the most blatantly unconstitutional laws and 
practices will proceed unimpeded by judicial review if no one has 
standing to raise them, or if those with standing choose not to bring 
their case to a court. Courts are not charged with enforcing the 
Constitution in the abstract, and may do so only in the context of 
specific cases and controversies.142 Constitutional violations often 
occur outside the purview of courts. Thus, one could argue that 
judges similarly have no authority to enforce constitutional 
limitations in the context of specific cases in which the parties fail to 
raise them. 
There is a significant difference, however, between a 
constitutional violation that does not form the basis of a justiciable 
case or controversy, and one that arises within a case that a court is 
required to hear and resolve. Pursuant to Article III, federal courts 
may only decide “Cases” or “Controversies,” and thus cannot address 
constitutional issues in the abstract. Courts were not intended to 
serve as roving commissions, seeking out constitutional errors and 
correcting them even when no individual has standing to seek judicial 
review. But that restriction on judicial power does not justify a court’s 
refusal to raise a constitutional question that goes to the heart of a 
case before it, and which the court is required to decide. If the parties 
ask the court to issue an order that is itself unconstitutional, or that is 
based on a constitutionally suspect legislative or executive command, 
courts certainly have the power, if not the obligation, to raise a 
constitutional infirmity overlooked or ignored by the parties. In short, 
the fact that courts cannot set their agenda does not mean that 
litigants can co-opt them into applying unconstitutional laws to 
achieve unconstitutional purposes. 
Judicial power to raise constitutional infirmities sua sponte finds 
further support in well-established doctrine requiring federal judges 
 
 141. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 142. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
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to satisfy themselves of their jurisdiction to preside over a dispute.143 
A lawyer must always be ready to respond to a federal judge’s queries 
regarding the court’s jurisdiction to hear the case, even if neither 
party raised the question. Litigants may not, through their mutual 
consent, obtain a judicial opinion on a matter outside of the subject 
matter headings listed in Article III. If courts could preside over cases 
beyond the limits of their constitutional and statutorily assigned 
authority whenever the parties wanted them to, they would impinge 
on the power of the political branches and usurp the role of state 
courts144—structural and institutional interests not always shared by 
the individual litigants. Accordingly, judges are required to satisfy 
themselves of their own jurisdiction no matter what the parties may 
think. 
These same rationales suggest that judges should also take notice 
of nonjurisdictional constitutional questions in cases in which they are 
asked to play a role in enabling one of the other branches to 
transgress the limits on its authority. If Congress has enacted a clearly 
unconstitutional statute—for instance, a statute that goes beyond its 
power under the Commerce Clause, or that establishes an 
unconstitutional condition on federal funding—then a judicial 
decision applying that statute permits Congress to exceed its 
constitutional authority. Why should judges be required to police the 
boundaries of their own power, and yet be helpless to check 
overstepping by the political branches simply because the parties fail 
to raise the matter? Likewise, if the parties misconstrue the 
Constitution, the Court should have the power to correct their mutual 
error rather than compound it by issuing a decision based on the 
parties’ misreading of the Constitution’s text. 
Several of the cases discussed in Part I.B illustrate this principle. 
In Washington v. Davis, the Court concluded that intentional 
discrimination is a necessary element of an equal protection violation, 
even though neither party raised that question. The Court chose to 
deviate from the norm against issue creation to avoid writing a 
decision that it believed incorrectly characterized constitutional limits 
on government action. Likewise, in Mapp v. Ohio, the Court held that 
the Constitution’s exclusionary rule applied to the states despite the 
fact that neither party made that argument, again choosing 
constitutional accuracy over the norm of party presentation. 
 
 143. See supra Part I.A. 
 144. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, at 42. 
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C. Issue Creation as a Safeguard of Legislative Power 
Judicial issue creation can safeguard legislative power by 
preventing the parties from ignoring or misrepresenting statutes. An 
incompetent lawyer can all too easily overlook or misconstrue a 
statute. Alternatively, a party might purposefully choose to avoid 
citing a relevant statute, or ignore a reasonable interpretation of a 
statute, for any number of reasons: the party might want the court to 
address a constitutional issue that could be avoided were a statute on 
point, or the relevant statute might be at odds with other aspects of a 
party’s litigation agenda, or the party might conclude that the statute 
is unconstitutional and thus cannot be relied upon. Dickerson is an 
example of the last possibility: the Department of Justice had a 
longstanding policy against asserting 18 U.S.C. § 3501 as a basis for 
the admission of confessions because it believed that the statute was 
unconstitutional. Courts can only ensure that statutes are applied 
accurately by questioning litigants’ interpretations and searching out 
relevant statutes that the litigants have ignored. 
The problem is exacerbated in cases involving the executive 
branch. The executive is the most frequent litigator before the federal 
courts, it has long-term interests that are at times opposed to those of 
Congress, and it has a constitutional obligation to determine 
independently both the meaning and constitutionality of the laws it 
enforces. Under Article II, the president takes an oath to “preserve, 
protect and defend the Constitution,”145 and has the power and duty 
to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,”146 which of 
necessity requires first locating the correct meaning of a legal text. 
Furthermore, the executive has prosecutorial discretion to prioritize 
its enforcement of the laws enacted by Congress.147 Thousands of law 
review pages have been devoted to defending the executive’s 
independent authority to determine the constitutionality of the 
statutes it administers, its right to refuse to enforce statutes when it 
 
 145. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8. 
 146. Id. art. II, § 3. 
 147. William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 831, 875–86 (2001) (“As part of the execution of the law, the Executive must 
decide whether to litigate and what legal positions the Administration will advance.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
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concludes they are unconstitutional, and its power to interpret laws as 
it sees best.148 
Under even the broadest conception of executive power, 
however, there are limits on the executive’s independent authority to 
interpret and apply the law. Scholars generally agree that the 
executive has to obey Supreme Court pronouncements about the 
meaning of the Constitution, even when the executive disagrees with 
the Court.149 And the executive cannot simply ignore laws, treaties, 
and regulations it dislikes when those sources of law require that the 
executive take specific action. Finally, the Constitution itself limits the 
executive’s interpretation and implementation of the law. For 
example, the executive cannot selectively enforce laws against some 
racial groups but not others, nor can it use its power to target its 
political enemies for disfavored treatment. 
A stringently applied rule against judicial issue creation would 
give the executive the option to ignore these limits on its authority to 
interpret and implement the law, and would do so at the expense of 
both legislative and judicial power. If a court cannot correct an 
executive misinterpretation of federal law, or raise a statute or treaty 
that the executive has chosen to ignore, then it enables the executive 
to displace the legislative and judicial roles in lawmaking and law 
pronouncement, respectively. 
Again, Dickerson provides an example of the problem. Congress 
enacted a statute that purported to override Miranda. As the Court 
described it, the validity of the statute turned on whether the Miranda 
Court “announced a constitutional rule or merely exercised its 
supervisory authority to regulate evidence in the absence of 
congressional direction.”150 If the former, then the statute was 
unconstitutional and Miranda governed; if the latter, the statute 
would displace Miranda and set the standard for the admission of 
confessions. The executive branch concluded that the statute was 
unconstitutional, and thus refused to rely on it as a basis for the 
admission of confessions—a decision well within the prosecutor’s 
discretion. But if courts were bound to decide cases solely on the 
 
 148. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say 
What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 321–43 (1994). 
 149. Morrison, supra note 118, at 1224 (“The conventional view . . . is that the executive 
branch is indeed bound by the Supreme Court’s determination that a given statute or 
governmental action is unconstitutional.”). 
 150. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 429, 437 (2000). 
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parties’ terms, then the executive’s litigation position would in 
essence repeal the statute. Rigid adherence to the norm against issue 
creation would give the executive branch authority to ask courts to 
decide laws on the executive’s terms, and not the legislature’s, 
upending the constitutionally assigned roles for these branches. 
Even more worrisome, the executive would have the power to 
establish the meaning of the law at the back end, when the law is 
being applied to individuals before the courts. As previously 
discussed, permitting the political branches to interpret the law in 
individual cases is troubling because their very political accountability 
raises the fear that they will apply the law unfairly to gain political 
advantage.151 The Framers provided judges with life tenure and salary 
protection in part to ensure that law is applied impartially in 
individual cases, a role that judges can only fulfill if they have the 
power to raise issues ignored by the parties when necessary. 
These concerns arise whenever any litigant misrepresents the law 
and a judge decides the case on that litigant’s terms. But the problem 
is particularly acute when it comes to the executive branch because of 
the frequency with which that branch appears before the federal 
courts, and because it is often the only entity able to litigate about the 
meaning of specific statutes, treaties, and constitutional provisions.152 
In light of its dominant role in federal litigation, the executive could 
systematically alter the meaning of federal law absent judicial 
intervention in case presentation. Finally, unlike a private litigant, the 
executive can combine its power to shape law as a litigant with its 
broad authority to interpret and enforce the law, thereby exercising 
extraordinary influence over the application of the law in individual 
cases.153 
Congress is well aware of the problem of executive infidelity to 
its statutory commands, and has passed legislation attempting to 
protect its legislative enactments when the executive refuses to do so. 
By statute, the Attorney General must inform Congress when the 
Attorney General or any other officer of the Department of Justice 
adopts a policy of refusing to enforce or defend a federal statute, rule, 
program, or policy, and in such cases Congress may submit amicus 
 
 151. See supra text accompanying notes 138–39. 
 152. See Devins, supra note 19, at 272–79. 
 153. Cf. Manning, supra note 138, at 680–85 (asserting that deference to agency 
interpretation of agency rules violates the separation of powers principle that lawmaking should 
be kept separate from law exposition). 
FROST IN FINAL 11/12/2009  10:58:50 PM 
2009] LIMITS OF ADVOCACY 491 
briefs and make arguments to the courts about why executive 
nonenforcement is misguided.154 Unfortunately, there is no similar 
means of protection when the executive branch adopts an 
interpretation of a federal statute that is at odds with Congress’s 
intent.155 In these cases, the judiciary serves as guardian of the 
integrity of statutory commands that might otherwise go unheeded. 
D. Issue Creation and the Common Law System 
The presumption against introducing new issues into litigation is 
also incompatible with the power of precedent in a common law 
system. The federal courts of appeals issue decisions that apply not 
only to the parties before the court but that also bind all the judges on 
that court and the district courts within that circuit. Lower courts 
have no choice but to obey even wrongheaded decisions of their 
superiors. Although a court’s obligation to follow its own precedent is 
not unyielding, stare decisis is nonetheless a hard doctrine to 
overcome.156 Every circuit court has adopted a rule mandating that a 
panel cannot overturn the decision of a previous panel absent an 
intervening decision by the U.S. Supreme Court that changes the 
law.157 Even those courts with the authority to overrule precedent, 
such as courts of appeals sitting en banc and the U.S. Supreme Court, 
rarely upset settled law. Precedent that is viewed as mistaken will 
nonetheless be followed by these courts absent “special 
justification.”158 
 
 154. 28 U.S.C. § 530D (2006). When signing the most recent version of this statute into law, 
President Bush issued a statement that the executive branch would construe the statute “in a 
manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary 
executive branch and to withhold information the disclosure of which could impair foreign 
relations, the national security, the deliberative processes of the Executive, or the performance 
of the Executive’s constitutional duties.” Statement on Signing the 21st Century Department of 
Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2010, 2010 (Nov. 2, 2002). 
Presumably, then, the Bush administration envisioned circumstances under which it would not 
inform Congress of its refusal to enforce a federal statute or rule. See Trevor W. Morrison, 
Executive Branch Avoidance and the Need for Congressional Notification, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 
SIDEBAR (2007), http://www.columbialawreview.org/articles/executive-branch-avoidance-and-
the-need-for-congressional-notification. 
 155. See Morrison, supra note 154. 
 156. Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1017 
(2003) (“[P]recedent does operate to preclude litigants in the mainstream of cases.”). 
 157. Id at 1017–18. 
 158. For example, in Dickerson, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its Miranda decision, 
concluding there was no “special justification” for overturning a longstanding precedent. 
Although Dickerson did not affirmatively embrace Miranda’s rationale, the majority 
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The power of precedent can be undermined by litigants in two 
ways. First, if litigants fail to fairly, completely, and accurately 
describe the law, judicial opinions may themselves contain flawed 
statements of law that will bind all who come after. Second, if litigants 
fail to cite and discuss binding precedent, they may evade its 
application unless the court raises the precedent sua sponte. In either 
case, allowing the parties’ incomplete presentations to taint judicial 
decisions is troubling in a common law system in which precedent 
controls the results in subsequent litigation. 
1. Creating Precedent.  A judicial decision that misstates the law 
because the parties passed over important arguments or failed to cite 
relevant statutes and legal opinions nonetheless stands as the last 
word. The conscientious lawyer advising a client on her legal 
obligations should note that a particular precedent is poorly reasoned, 
overlooks key issues, and might be overruled or at least distinguished 
upon a convincing reargument. But it would be imprudent for a 
lawyer to suggest that the decision may be blithely ignored. 
Particularly troubling is when the parties raise all the relevant 
legal claims, but fail to make the most compelling arguments in 
support of those claims, which may lead to the creation of flawed 
precedent by the court. The Supreme Court has been sensitive to this 
problem in the past. In Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services,159 the 
Court concluded that it could turn to state law standards to fill gaps in 
a federal statute, even though the parties had not timely raised the 
applicability of state law.160 The Court explained: “When an issue or 
claim is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the 
particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains 
the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction 
of governing law.”161 The Court noted in a footnote that judges are 
never obligated to raise a legal argument waived by a party, but 
cautioned that if a court of appeals “undertakes to sanction a litigant 
by deciding an effectively raised claim according to a truncated body 
of law, the court should refrain from issuing an opinion that could 
 
nonetheless refused to abandon it, citing stare decisis as its primary justification: “Whether or 
not we would agree with Miranda’s reasoning and its resulting rule, were we addressing the 
issue in the first instance, the principles of stare decisis weigh heavily against overruling it now.” 
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000). 
 159. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90 (1991). 
 160. Id. at 99. 
 161. Id. 
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reasonably be understood by lower courts and nonparties to establish 
binding circuit precedent on the issue decided.”162 In short, Kamen 
defended a court’s power to raise a new legal argument to avoid 
issuing an opinion containing erroneous statements of law, in part to 
prevent the creation of flawed precedent. 
As discussed in Part I, the norm against issue creation is often 
defended on grounds specific to the parties before the court. For 
example, judges will assert that the parties have waived an issue, or 
failed to adequately brief it, and thus a court will penalize the party 
by refusing to consider the question. But these litigant-specific 
rationales for the norm cannot justify issuing incorrect statements of 
law that will bind, or at least affect, all those similarly situated to the 
parties before the court. If appellate courts were akin to private 
arbitrators, issuing decisions that were relevant only to the parties 
before them, then it would make sense for the court to impose harsh 
consequences on those who failed to adhere to the rules. But in light 
of the precedential nature of judicial decisionmaking, the personal 
failings of the parties before the court do not provide a sufficient 
rationale for overlooking compelling and relevant arguments that the 
parties failed to raise. In short, an inflexible norm of party 
presentation is more appropriate for a system of private dispute 
resolution than one that combines dispute resolution with public law 
declaration. 
2. Protecting Precedent.  Just as it is important for courts to 
respect stare decisis, it is essential that litigants not be allowed to slip 
its bonds simply by refusing to cite established precedent. Stare 
decisis is an important limit on judicial discretion, providing stability 
and predictability in the interpretation of law.163 The United States 
inherited an English legal tradition in which judges were guided by 
prior decisions and canons of construction, and at least theoretically 
were not free to make unconstrained pronouncements on the 
meaning of the law. Alexander Hamilton explained that like their 
English counterparts, federal judges would be “bound down by strict 
rules and precedents which serve to define and point out their duty in 
every particular case that comes before them.”164 As one legal 
 
 162. Id. at 100 n.5. 
 163. Molot, supra note 28, at 72 (discussing how stare decisis serves as a constraint on 
judicial discretion). 
 164. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 141, at 471. 
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historian put it, “the doctrine of precedent” was “viewed [by the 
Framers] as a means of controlling judges’ discretion and restraining 
their possible arbitrary tendencies.”165 
No one would argue that a court is free to ignore a binding 
precedent simply because the parties fail to cite it.166 Likewise, even 
when litigants agree on misstatements of law, courts must be free to 
articulate the correct legal standard when deciding their cases. If stare 
decisis is to serve as a meaningful constraint on judicial discretion, 
neither litigants nor judges can be given the freedom to create new 
legal standards, unfettered by either past precedent or existing law, 
that may then mislead all those who must comply. 
Indeed, it is anomalous that common law countries operate 
within an adversarial system that rejects judicial issue creation while 
civil law countries follow an inquisitorial model that allows for it. In a 
common law system, judicial decisions have the weight of law and are 
binding on all those who follow; in civil law systems, judicial decisions 
are “merely evidence of the law” and therefore do not carry the same 
legal force.167 Accordingly, issue creation would seem to be most 
valuable in a common law system, where judges are responsible not 
just for resolving a dispute but for settling a question of law for all 
time, and thus where incomplete or inaccurate litigant articulations of 
the law are all the more problematic. Part III contends that the 
solution to this anomaly is to adopt a more flexible conception of 
adversarialism that makes room for judicial issue creation without 
abandoning the dialectical exchange at the core of the adversary 
process. 
III.  ISSUE CREATION AND THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM 
In the typical case, the federal judiciary’s law-pronouncement 
function is perfectly compatible with adversarial theory. Under an 
adversarial system as usually defined, the parties frame and argue the 
case before a passive judge, who then decides the dispute on the 
parties’ preferred terms.168 When the parties are well matched, and 
when they both have an interest in presenting all the arguments in 
favor of their position, adversary process will produce the best 
 
 165. WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW 20–21 (1975). 
 166. See, e.g., Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 511–12 (1994) (holding that an appellate 
court should take notice of legal precedent overlooked by the parties). 
 167. See supra note 24. 
 168. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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possible judicial decision to guide society about the meaning of law. 
The system breaks down, however, when the parties have either 
intentionally or accidentally overlooked a legal argument relevant to 
the dispute, forcing judges to choose between resolving the dispute on 
the parties’ terms or issuing an inaccurate statement of law. In this 
Part, this Article contends that these two functions can be reconciled 
by adopting a more flexible conception of adversary process that 
permits judges to step in to augment party presentations while 
maintaining the opportunity for an adversarial exchange on the new 
issues they raise. 
A. Incorporating Issue Creation into Adversary Theory 
Party presentation of the facts and legal arguments in a dispute is 
a central tenet of the adversarial system of justice, and the adversarial 
system itself is widely acknowledged to be a fundamental feature of 
the American adjudicatory process.169 Accordingly, judicial power to 
raise new legal claims and theories, and then to decide cases on 
grounds that the parties did not identify and perhaps do not wish to 
assert, is seemingly at odds with the judicial role in the American 
legal system. The many exceptions to the party presentation norm 
discussed in Part I.B thus seem incompatible with the prevailing 
model of adjudication in the United States. 
But perhaps the problem is with adversary theory itself, at least 
in its purest form. First, it appears best suited to a judicial system that 
is focused on dispute resolution, and seems less relevant for a legal 
system in which the judiciary is also charged with issuing accurate 
pronouncements about the meaning of law that bind future litigants. 
Second, even as a method of dispute resolution, adversary theory falls 
short if the parties are mismatched, or if both simply fail to grasp the 
essential legal and factual questions at the heart of their case. These 
defects have been widely noted before, and perhaps for that reason 
the U.S. legal system has never been perfectly adversarial (as this 
Article demonstrates).170 Nonetheless, the adversary system as an 
ideal type has a strong hold on jurists’ conceptions of their role.171 
 
 169. STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE 20 
(1984). 
 170. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 1, at 824 (describing flaws in the adversarial system); id. 
at 843 (discussing the problem of “poor quality of legal representation”); William B. 
Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1865, 1867–68 
(2002) (noting that the adversary system breaks down when the parties are not evenly matched); 
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The contrasting theories of Lon Fuller, Abram Chayes, and 
Owen Fiss illustrate the tension between dispute resolution and law 
pronouncement, and may also provide the key to resolving that 
tension. Professor Fuller is closely associated with the dispute 
resolution model of adjudication, defined as one in which two private 
parties resolve their disputes through an adversarial presentation to 
an impartial and passive decisionmaker. Professors Chayes and Fiss 
critiqued this traditional account of adjudication.172 They argued that 
modern adjudication was (and should be) primarily focused on 
articulating norms that extended far beyond the parties. Chayes noted 
that under the “traditional” model described by Fuller, adjudication is 
“a vehicle for settling disputes between private parties about private 
rights,” which he contrasted with the “public law” model in which 
“the object of litigation is the vindication of constitutional or 
statutory policies.”173 Likewise, Fiss asserted that while “dispute 
resolution may be one consequence of” adjudication, he argued that 
the “function of the judge . . . is not to resolve disputes, but to give the 
proper meaning to our public values.”174 
Consistent with their conception of adjudication as an 
opportunity for law pronouncement affecting many, Professors 
Chayes and Fiss both asserted the need for a more proactive judicial 
role in the framing of litigation. Chayes argued that in the public law 
litigation model, the judge has “responsibility . . . for organizing and 
shaping litigation to ensure a just and viable outcome.”175 Fiss noted 
how easily a court could “be led into error” by the parties, who 
“wittingly or unwittingly” could compromise the interests of others, 
and he concluded that it is “almost absurd [for a court] to rely 
exclusively on the initiatives of those persons or agencies who 
 
Sward, supra note 42, at 312 (stating that “the parties may be quite unequal in resources or 
skill” and that “[a]dversary theory tends to ignore this inequality”). 
 171. Sklansky, supra note 48, at 4 (noting that the vast majority of American judges believes 
that the inquisitorial role played by judges in civil law systems should be avoided). 
 172. See Fiss, supra note 22, at 39 (“The most sustained effort to build a case for dispute 
resolution on the basis of moral axioms is Lon Fuller’s essay, The Forms and Limits of 
Adjudication.”). 
 173. Chayes, supra note 28, at 1282–84. 
 174. Fiss, supra note 22, at 30; see also id. at 29 (“I doubt whether dispute resolution is an 
adequate description of the social function of courts. To my mind courts exist to give meaning to 
our public values . . . .”); Fiss, supra note 28, at 1085 (stating that the “job” of a judge “is not to 
maximize the ends of private parties . . . but to explicate and give force to the values embodied 
in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and statutes”). 
 175. Chayes, supra note 28, at 1302; see also id. at 1298 (describing the judge’s “active role in 
shaping, organizing and facilitating the litigation”). 
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happened to be named plaintiff and defendant.”176 Although neither 
scholar challenged the party presentation rule specifically, both 
sought to transform the judge from passive recipient of the parties’ 
arguments to proactive participant in the framing of litigation. 
At first glance, there appears to be an unbridgeable gap between 
Professor Fuller’s dispute resolution model of adjudication, which 
corresponds with an adversarial system of party presentation, and 
Professors Fiss and Chayes’s public law model, which requires a more 
active, and thus inquisitorial-like, judicial role. This gap is mirrored in 
the disjunction between law pronouncement and dispute resolution. 
But perhaps there is a middle ground that allows law pronouncement 
and dispute resolution to occur in the same process, and to do so 
without sacrificing the goals of the adversarial system. Indeed, upon 
closer inspection, Fiss’s, Chayes’s, and Fuller’s conceptions all allow 
for procedures that integrate dispute resolution and law 
pronouncement, belying the sometimes monochromatic portrayal of 
their respective views.177 An examination of these scholars’ 
approaches to the problem provides some guidance on how courts 
might integrate the dispute resolution and law pronouncement 
functions. 
To start, Professor Fuller’s view of adjudication left room for 
more active judicial participation than is commonly assumed.178 Fuller 
understood the adversarial system as intent “on keeping distinct the 
function of the advocate, on the one hand, from that of the 
judge . . . on the other,”179 which allowed for the possibility that the 
judge could introduce new arguments into the adjudication as long as 
he did not give up his judicial role for that of advocate. Although 
Fuller asserted that the system works best when the decisionmaker 
“rests his decision wholly on the proofs and argument actually 
presented to him by the parties,” he acknowledged that “[i]n 
practice . . . it is not always possible to realize this ideal.”180 Fuller 
 
 176. Fiss, supra note 22, at 25–26. 
 177. Cf. Molot, supra note 28 (describing how the traditional forms of adjudication 
described by Fuller provided useful guides to judges overseeing class actions and other types of 
modern, “public law” adjudication). 
 178. Id. at 35 n.17; see also Bone, supra note 22, at 1275 (arguing that Fuller’s work has been 
misconstrued, and claiming that in fact “Fuller’s theory lies somewhere between the public law 
and dispute resolution poles”). 
 179. LANDSMAN, supra note 169, at 1 (quoting Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in 
TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 34, 34–35 (Harold J. Berman ed., 1961)). 
 180. Fuller, supra note 19, at 388. 
FROST IN FINAL 11/12/2009  10:58:50 PM 
498 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:447 
noted that judges could raise new arguments without abandoning 
party participation or judicial neutrality by seeking reargument or 
issuing a tentative decree.181 In other words, Fuller himself recognized 
that judges can raise legal issues without transforming themselves into 
advocates. 
Likewise, Professors Chayes and Fiss’s divergence from the 
traditional forms of adjudication described by Professor Fuller has 
been overstated. Chayes and Fiss asserted that judges should take a 
more active role in framing cases, but sought to find ways for judges 
to do so without jeopardizing their neutrality. Fiss observed that it 
would be “foolish for the judge to assume a representational role 
himself,” which could sacrifice judicial impartiality, and thus he 
suggested that the judge should instead expand opportunities for 
interested persons representing diverse viewpoints to participate in 
cases to which they are not parties.182 Similarly, Chayes did not expect 
the judge to both raise and argue new legal issues, noting that a judge 
can “appoint guardians ad litem for unrepresented interests” and 
should “employ experts and amici to inform himself on aspects of the 
case not adequately developed by the parties.”183 Thus, Chayes and 
Fiss’s conceptions of adjudication maintained the distinct roles for 
advocates and judges defended by Fuller even while promoting 
judicial power to reframe litigant disputes.184 
 
 181. Id. at 389. 
 182. Fiss, supra note 22, at 26. 
 183. Chayes, supra note 28, at 1312. 
 184. Although the standard definition of the adversarial system is one in which opposing 
parties present facts and legal arguments to a mostly passive and entirely impartial 
decisionmaker, a few scholars have taken a broader view. Professor John Langbein considered 
the core characteristic of an adversarial system to be advancement of partisan positions through 
a dialectical exchange, but he rejected an understanding of the adversarial system that left 
judges sitting passively on the sidelines. In his article promoting the West German dispute 
resolution system, Langbein argued that United States judges could become more involved in 
factual investigation without eliminating adversarialness from the system. As Langbein 
described it, even systems traditionally understood as inquisitorial, such as that existing in West 
Germany in the 1980s, have many adversarial components. Indeed, Langbein argued that the 
West German system is an adversarial system. See Langbein, supra note 1, at 824. West German 
judges take the lead in factual investigations, but they give the parties opportunities to suggest 
lines of inquiry and sources of evidence, to supplement judicial questioning of witnesses, and to 
argue inferences from the facts elicited. Although Langbein acknowledged that the traditional 
view of an adversarial legal system was one in which the parties, and not the judge, were 
charged with factfinding, he nonetheless argued that the essential adversarial character could be 
maintained even if judges were given the lead role in factual investigation. Id. at 824–25. This 
Article does not take a position on this question, but makes a more modest suggestion along the 
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Accordingly, all three scholars seem to acknowledge that the 
American adversarial system has enough play in the joints to allow 
judges (as well as third parties, such as amici) to raise arguments 
overlooked by the parties without compromising the essentially 
partisan nature of dispute resolution in the United States. The next 
Section explores how judicial issue creation, carefully managed, can 
be faithful to the goals of adversarial theory. 
B. Issue Creation and the Goals of the Adversarial System 
Judicial issue creation is consistent with the rationales cited in 
support of the adversarial system, discussed in detail in Part I.185 Issue 
creation can enhance truth seeking without sacrificing a judge’s 
impartiality or undermining litigant autonomy. Indeed, permitting a 
judge to introduce legal issues might answer, at least in small part, the 
most persistent criticism of adversarial procedure—that it fails when 
the parties’ skills and resources are not evenly matched. The pages 
that follow seek to justify issue creation on adversary theory’s own 
terms by demonstrating that the adversarial nature of dispute 
resolution can be maintained, along with the benefits that are claimed 
to arise from it, even when judges play a role in developing legal 
arguments. 
1. Enhancing Truth Seeking.  The adversarial system has been 
touted as the best method of determining the truth of the matter in 
dispute, and thus of reaching the right result in each case.186 The basic 
characteristics of adversary procedure—such as notice, a hearing, and 
an opportunity to present evidence and test an opponent’s evidence—
 
same lines. Judges may identify legal arguments overlooked by the parties without violating the 
central tenets of adversary theory. 
 185. As a threshold matter, it is worth noting that the claimed benefits of the adversarial 
system discussed below are themselves disputed, particularly of late, when adversary process has 
come under sustained attack. See, e.g., Molot, supra note 28, at 31 (noting that “the traditional 
adversarial process has come to be viewed with considerable skepticism” (citing Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 5, 12–24 (1996))). I do not seek to prove that these benefits in fact accompany 
adversarial procedures—that is a separate debate that has been the subject of numerous other 
articles. Rather, this Part argues that sua sponte decisionmaking is compatible with adversarial 
theory in that it promotes many of the same goals. 
 186. Monroe H. Freedman, Our Constitutionalized Adversary System, 1 CHAP. L. REV. 57, 
73 (1998) (“[T]he adversary system is the method of dispute resolution that is most effective in 
determining truth . . . .”). 
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are lauded as essential to reaching the correct outcome.187 As the 
Supreme Court declared: “[O]ur legal tradition regards the adversary 
process as the best means of ascertaining truth and minimizing the 
risk of error.”188 
And yet to achieve this goal, there must be at least a rough 
equality in the resources and presentation skills of the advocates for 
either party—what Professor Frank Michelman, among others, refers 
to as “equipage equality”—that all too often does not exist. As one 
legal scholar observed, 
[o]ur adversary system is premised upon the idea that the most 
accurate and acceptable outcomes are produced by a real battle 
between equally-armed contestants; thus the adversary system 
requires, if it is to achieve these goals, some measure of equality in 
the litigants’ capacities to produce their proofs and arguments.189 
Without equipage equality, “the stronger case might not necessarily 
be the better case.”190 When the resources and abilities of opposing 
parties are lopsided, the adversarial system will fail to produce 
accurate results. The wealthier, sophisticated, repeat-player litigants 
will usually win; the poorer, outgunned, one-shot litigants will lose, 
regardless of the merit of their cases.191 Indeed, critics cite this 
problem as one of the adversarial system’s major flaws, and note that 
the other claimed benefits of adversarial presentation—the dignity 
and participation values, for example—are small compensation for 
the inevitable losses suffered by the weaker party.192 As one 
prominent critic of the adversarial system commented: “The simple 
truth is that very little in our adversary system is designed to match 
 
 187. This view is under significant strain today, however. Even vigorous proponents of the 
adversary system are willing to concede that the ascertainment of truth is not its forte. See 
Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 505 
(1986) (commenting that John Wigmore’s description of cross-examination as the “greatest 
legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth” is likely to generate “chuckles”). 
 188. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13 (1979); see also Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 
U.S. 18, 28 (1981) (“[O]ur adversary system presupposes [that] accurate and just results are 
most likely to be obtained through the equal contest of opposed interests . . . .”). 
 189. Rubenstein, supra note 170, at 1867–68. 
 190. Id. at 1873–74. 
 191. Stephan Landsman, a strong proponent of the adversarial system, nonetheless 
acknowledged that “[i]f the lawyers fail to carry out their duty, development of the case will be 
impeded, and the adversary process may be undermined.” LANDSMAN, supra note 169, at 4. 
 192. Sward, supra note 42, at 312 (observing that “the parties may be quite unequal in 
resources or skill” and that “[a]dversary theory tends to ignore this inequality”). 
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combatants of comparable prowess, even though adversarial prowess 
is a main factor affecting the outcome of litigation.”193 
By raising overlooked issues and legal authority, a judge can 
ameliorate the imbalances that undermine the adversarial system. For 
that very reason, judges have a tradition of assisting pro se litigants 
with case presentation. The same rationale that permits judges to 
depart from the party presentation rule in pro se cases should apply in 
cases in which one lawyer is clearly outgunned. This exception to the 
principle of party presentation should be viewed not as a deviation 
from adversary theory, but rather as a means of promoting 
adversarialism by ensuring that it works as best it can. The judge can 
make the adversary system more efficient at reaching just and 
accurate outcomes by helping to right the imbalance in opposing 
lawyers’ skills and resources. 
Allowing judges to raise issues is not equivalent to transforming 
the judge into an advocate for one side or the other. An advocate 
finds facts and legal precedents that help only the one party he has 
been charged to represent, and then uses them to make arguments on 
that party’s behalf. But judges need not go so far to correct an 
imbalance in the system. If a judge realizes that there is an important 
legal argument that has been overlooked, or valuable precedent that 
has gone uncited, the judge does not act as advocate if she points out 
the missing information and provides both parties with an 
opportunity to address the issues she has identified. If neither party 
chooses to do so, the court can obtain guidance from an amicus 
assigned to make the relevant arguments. In short, the line between 
judge and advocate can be firmly maintained even when a judge takes 
on a more active role in framing the case. 
2. Maintaining the Impartial Decisionmaker.  By requiring that 
judges remain passive and reactive, adversarial process supposedly 
protects judges from forming prejudgments and developing biases 
that are claimed to be a drawback of the inquisitorial system.194 
Professor Fuller concluded that “in the absence of an adversary 
presentation, there is a strong tendency by any deciding official to 
reach a conclusion at an early stage and to adhere to that conclusion 
 
 193. Langbein, supra note 1, at 843. 
 194. Resnik, supra note 39, at 383 n.41 (noting that the adversarial system “emphasize[s] 
judges’ disengagement as the means of achieving impartiality”). 
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in the face of conflicting considerations later developed.”195 Fuller 
noted that a committee of the American Bar Association (which he 
chaired) had recently reached the same conclusion: “An adversary 
presentation seems the only effective means for combating this 
natural human tendency to judge too swiftly in terms of the familiar 
that which is not yet fully known.”196 
The fear is that judges will be unable to remain impartial when 
deciding legal questions that they themselves have inserted into the 
litigation. Furthermore, the appearance of justice might suffer 
because the litigants and the general public might conclude that the 
judge is now a partisan player in the litigation rather than a detached 
observer to the dispute.197 Erwin Chemerinsky made this very point 
when criticizing the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Dickerson. He argued 
that the Fourth Circuit invoked the federal statute over the parties’ 
objections “precisely because it wanted to reach a particular result: 
upholding its constitutionality,”198 and he concluded that courts should 
not raise issues sua sponte to avoid the appearance of bias.199 
The concern is a serious one, and thus worth closer scrutiny. If a 
judge were to advocate for one of the parties by investigating facts 
and researching legal arguments to assist only that party, the judge 
would be tainted. But there is no reason to think that a judge who 
notes an overlooked issue and asks the parties to investigate and brief 
it will review that issue any differently than a question raised by the 
parties themselves. Indeed, if simply raising a legal issue sua sponte 
were enough to jeopardize judicial impartiality, then presumably due 
process would require that judges never do so. Yet judges regularly 
raise on their own motion threshold procedural questions, such as 
subject matter jurisdiction and res judicata.200 Indeed, judges are 
required to ascertain their own jurisdiction before hearing a case—an 
 
 195. Fuller, supra note 179, at 43; see also LANDSMAN, supra note 169, at 37 (“If the judge is 
assigned the task of making factual inquiry, both theoretical analysis and empirical data suggest 
that his biases are likely to be intensified and his decisions opened to prejudicial influence.”); 
Freedman, supra note 186, at 75–80 (1998) (contrasting adversarial and inquisitorial judicial 
models). 
 196. Fuller, supra note 179, at 44 (quoting Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional 
Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1160 (1958)). 
 197. See LANDSMAN, supra note 169, at 44–45 (“Because the judge seldom takes the lead in 
conducting the proceedings, he is unlikely to appear to be partisan or to become embroiled in 
the contest. His detachment preserves the appearance of fairness as well as fairness itself.”). 
 198. Chemerinsky, supra note 19, at 302. 
 199. Id. at 291. 
 200. See supra Part I.B. 
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issue about which judges arguably are self-interested because at least 
some would prefer to clear their dockets and avoid the extra work. 
Courts usually seek supplemental briefing on these questions, and 
sometimes conclude that their concerns were unfounded. If judges are 
capable of both raising and deciding these questions impartially, why 
should they forgo raising issues that go to the very heart of the 
dispute? 
Moreover, judges are forced into far more conflicted positions on 
a regular basis. Appellate courts routinely require district court 
judges to reconsider recently issued judgments, reduce sentences they 
have just handed down, vacate convictions they have just presided 
over, or apply a new legal standard after being reversed. Trial judges 
for the most part faithfully follow appellate court mandates even 
when they must repudiate their own view of the law and apply a new 
standard of the appellate court’s choosing.201 As Professor Chayes 
observed, judges are “governed by a professional ideal of reflective 
and dispassionate analysis of the problem before [them],” which 
enables them to apply law with which they disagree.202 Distrust of 
judicial power to reframe legal questions impartially is at odds with a 
system that makes such demands on its judges. 
To be sure, judges should be careful to avoid putting themselves 
into the shoes of an advocate. As Professors Fiss and Chayes both 
argued, judges should not take on the task of representing any party’s 
interest, but rather should seek out amici, experts, and guardians ad 
litem to do so for them when the parties themselves are unable or 
unwilling to brief and argue a point of law the judge thinks relevant.203 
But with these safeguards in place, judges are perfectly capable of 
resolving legal questions they raise in the first instance without bias.204 
 
 201. Resnik, supra note 39, at 428 (“Many current practices assume that trial judges can 
compartmentalize their minds, disregard inappropriate evidence, and reconsider past decisions 
in light of new information.”). 
 202. Chayes, supra note 28, at 1308. 
 203. See supra notes 182–83 and accompanying text. 
 204. Unfortunately, the judiciary’s reputation for impartiality has suffered under the status 
quo, in which courts make ad hoc exceptions to the norm of party presentation without 
articulating a rationale for doing so. Judges who introduce new issues are viewed with suspicion, 
especially when the issue they raise accords with their perceived ideological bias—such as when 
the notably conservative Fourth Circuit concluded sua sponte that Miranda had been 
overridden by statute. Dickerson v. United States, 166 F.3d 667, 695 (4th Cir. 1999). As one 
critic of judicial issue creation observed, the “absence of a consistent principle leaves courts 
open to the accusation that ignoring the adversary process is a political action, where the court 
reaches out to legislate instead of following judicial norms.” Miller, supra note 68, at 1260. 
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More worrisome is the possibility that judges will end up raising 
arguments to favor the party that they would prefer to win the case. If 
judges felt free to raise new legal issues, they might look for legal 
arguments that benefit one category of litigant or interest over 
another. But this concern is really about judicial bias generally. If a 
judge is not truly impartial, she will likely interpret the facts and law 
to the benefit of one party and the detriment of the other, regardless 
of whether she raises a new issue sua sponte. In other words, issue 
creation may reflect bias, but is not likely to lead to bias. In fact, 
permitting issue creation might improve matters. If the parties are 
given an opportunity to respond to any new issue raised by the judge, 
as adversarial theory requires, they can counter any subconscious 
judicial bias by describing the flaws in the judge’s legal analysis. 
Indeed, if the judge is inhibited from raising an overlooked legal 
argument, the issue of law he identified might influence him more 
than if it is fully ventilated and found to be irrelevant to the case 
before him. 
3. Preserving Litigant Autonomy.  A noninstrumentalist 
argument in favor of the adversarial system is that parties are more 
satisfied with the decisionmaker’s result when they are given an 
opportunity to be heard on their own terms.205 Party control “focuses 
the litigation upon the questions of greatest importance to the parties, 
making more likely a decision tailored to their needs,” whereas a 
“judge-dominated procedure increases the likelihood that the needs 
of the litigants will not be fully appreciated or satisfied.”206 Giving 
litigants control over case presentation is thus claimed to lead to more 
accurate and better-received decisions than a judge-dominated 
system of dispute resolution. 
Furthermore, legal commentators observe that party 
presentation is well suited to the American national character. As 
Professor Landsman describes it, party presentation ensures that the 
dispute resolution process will center on the interests of the individual 
“rather than those of his attorney, of the court, or of society at 
large.”207 Proponents claim that the opportunity for individuals to be 
heard—to have their day in court—promotes respect for human 
 
 205. LANDSMAN, supra note 169, at 44 (“Adversary theory holds that if a party is intimately 
involved in the adjudicatory process and feels that he has been given a fair opportunity to 
present his case, he is likely to accept the results whether favorable or not.”). 
 206. Id. at 4. 
 207. Id. at 46. 
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dignity and places a human face on abstract disputes.208 The United 
States is a highly individualistic society that values personal choice 
and expression above membership in groups.209 Generally speaking, 
most Americans place a greater value on individual freedom and 
express a greater distrust of centralized governmental authority than 
most Europeans.210 Accordingly, Americans prefer a system that gives 
private parties, rather than governmental actors such as judges, 
control over the presentation of evidence and the framing of 
litigation. 
Judicial issue creation need not undermine litigant autonomy, 
however. Litigants are still able to frame the case as they see best, and 
the court must still read and respond to their legal arguments. 
Although a judge may ask the litigants to provide supplemental briefs 
on issues the judge raised sua sponte, a party is always free to respond 
that it does not believe the argument raised by the court is one on 
which it should prevail. In Dickerson, for instance, the government 
informed the Fourth Circuit that it believed 18 U.S.C. § 3501 was 
unconstitutional, and thus refused to rely on that statute as a basis for 
admitting Dickerson’s confession.211 Although courts have the last 
word on the meaning of the law, they have no power to force any 
litigant, including the executive branch, to defend a statute it has 
 
 208. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 67–103 (1988); 
Sward, supra note 42, at 317 (noting that as the adversary system’s ability to locate truth has 
come under attack, its supporters have cited its ability to promote human dignity as its primary 
rationale); see also LANDSMAN, supra note 169, at 37 (stating that party control of litigation 
results in more complete information). 
 209. See LANDSMAN, supra note 169, at 24 (“The element of party control of proceedings 
apparent in English procedure from the earliest times was also attractive to the intensely 
individualist polity of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The English and American 
judicial process made increasing allowances for each party to run his lawsuit as he saw fit, to 
voice his claims and to select his evidence. The judicial decision was directly tied to the 
presentations of the parties. It is not surprising that these facets of procedure were accentuated 
in an age preoccupied with the establishment of individual political and economic rights.”). 
 210. Langbein, supra note 1, at 855 (“Americans will long remain uncomfortable at the 
prospect of a more bureaucratic judiciary. . . . Some observers point to that elusive construct, 
national character. Europeans in general and Germans in particular are thought to be more 
respectful of authority, hence better disposed toward the more bureaucratic mode of justice that 
judicialized fact-gathering entails.”). 
 211. Dickerson v. United States, 166 F.3d 667, 672 (4th Cir. 1999). Likewise, in Pearson v. 
Callahan, 128 S. Ct. 1702 (2008), the Court asked the parties to address whether its precedent in 
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), should be overruled, but neither party was compelled to 
argue that precedent should fall (and, in fact, both claimed that it should be upheld in modified 
form). Pearson, 128 S. Ct. at 1702–03; see infra text accompanying notes 228–29. 
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concluded is unconstitutional, or which it believes does not apply to 
the case at hand.212 
Courts have readily available alternatives in those rare cases in 
which litigants refuse to defend the constitutionality of a statute—
they can assign an amicus to argue in favor of the statute. Indeed, in 
Dickerson, Paul Cassell had already submitted an amicus brief in 
defense of the statute, and the Fourth Circuit granted him argument 
time as well. He ably played the same role in the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Turning to an amicus is a perfectly acceptable solution to a 
breakdown in the adversarial process, as it maintains the dialectical, 
partisan exchange essential to adversarial theory. In short, a litigant’s 
power to control the case he presents to the court remains unchanged 
even in a system in which judges are encouraged to raise issues sua 
sponte. 
4. Protecting Institutional Competence.  Adversary process is 
praised for its compatibility with judges’ core institutional 
competences. Judges are well suited to resolving disputes initiated by 
the parties, but lack the institutional capacity to frame cases 
themselves. Judges do not have the staff or funds to personally 
investigate the facts of the cases that come before them, nor do they 
share the parties’ incentives to uncover all the information that could 
assist them in making their case.213 Judges are politically insulated and 
unaccountable, making them especially inept at identifying the 
pressing social problems most in need of resolution.214 In contrast, 
 
 212. The Fourth Circuit was highly critical of the government, claiming that the Department 
of Justice had “elevat[ed] politics over law.” Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 672. Although I defend the 
Fourth Circuit’s discretion to raise the statute sua sponte, I believe that the court erred in 
criticizing the executive branch for refusing to argue that § 3501 displaced Miranda. I agree with 
Professor Chemerinsky, who argued that the “Fourth Circuit falsely attributed a political motive 
to the Justice Department to pave the way for it to consider § 3501 sua sponte.” Chemerinsky, 
supra note 19, at 290. As Chemerinsky noted, “[t]here is no imaginable political benefit to the 
incumbent administration from not using § 3501.” Id. 
 213. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221 n.10 (1974) (“[The 
judicial process] is in sharp contrast to the political processes in which the Congress can initiate 
inquiry and action, define issues and objectives, and exercise virtually unlimited power by way 
of hearings and reports, thus making a record for plenary consideration and solutions. The 
legislative function is inherently general rather than particular and is not intended to be 
responsive to adversaries asserting specific claims or interests peculiar to themselves.”); Miller, 
supra note 30, at 1050 (“[S]ua sponte consideration of issues is an inefficient use of judicial 
resources. . . . [R]elying on litigants to present arguments in cases [enables courts to] focus their 
energies on evaluating these arguments.”). 
 214. Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or 
Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1037 (1968) (“The court, not being a 
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private litigants will bring those cases most important to them, and 
are well situated, and highly motivated, to unearth the facts and 
sources of law that will support their case.215 
These institutional competence arguments are good reason to 
assign fact investigation and agenda setting to the litigants rather than 
to the judge, but they do not support the conclusion that judges 
should similarly play no role in identifying overlooked legal issues. To 
the contrary, federal judges are ideally suited to raise overlooked 
legal issues sua sponte. Most federal judges practiced law for several 
decades before taking the bench, and many were selected for a 
federal judgeship precisely because they were unusually successful 
lawyers.216 Federal judges are conditioned to think about the case as 
an advocate, and thus to formulate the best legal arguments for each 
side.217 A rigid rule of party presentation squanders this trove of 
judicial expertise by muzzling the best lawyer in the room. 
To be sure, judges do not have the time or resources to 
investigate new lines of argument in each case before them, and this 
Article does not advocate that judges go so far. The point here is only 
that when judges do stumble upon a new legal claim, source of law, or 
line of reasoning, they should not be discouraged from noting that 
issue and asking the parties to address it. 
Writing for a Seventh Circuit panel that refused to raise an 
overlooked (and winning) issue for a party whose lawyer dropped the 
ball, Judge Posner argued that “we cannot have a rule that in a 
sympathetic case an appellant can serve us up a muddle in the hope 
 
representative institution, not having initiating powers and not having a staff for the gathering 
of information, must rely on the parties and their advocates to frame the problem and to present 
the opposing considerations relevant to its solution.”). 
 215. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, at 40 (“Because federal courts have limited ability to 
conduct independent investigations, they must depend on the parties to fully present all relevant 
information to them. It is thought that adverse parties, with a stake in the outcome of the 
litigation, will perform this task best.”); see also Molot, supra note 28, at 59–63 (arguing that 
judges are institutionally suited to rely on parties to frame issues). 
 216. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 34 (2d ed. 1985) 
(“[Judges] have successful careers either in private practice or in government . . . . They are 
appointed or elected to judicial positions on the basis of a variety of factors, including success in 
practice, their reputation among their fellow lawyers, and political influence.”); Resnik, supra 
note 39, at 426 (“Many [judges] have been trial lawyers . . . .”). 
 217. But see Resnik, supra note 39, at 426 (“[J]udges may well overestimate the extent of 
their wisdom. Many have been trial lawyers; they have some appreciation for which litigant 
tactics are well founded and which are dilatory. But because few have practiced in all of the 
diverse areas of federal court jurisdiction, they may reach ill-founded conclusions in cases about 
which they really know very little.”). 
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that we or our law clerks will find somewhere in it a reversible 
error.”218 But it is hard to see why not. Federal judges are public 
servants, appointed by elected officials and paid in taxpayers’ dollars. 
If the lawyers have failed to perform their function effectively, and 
the wise and experienced judge is aware of important legal arguments 
overlooked by one or the other, there is no reason for the judge to 
turn a blind eye to the winning arguments he identified. Although 
Judge Posner feared that judicial issue creation might diminish 
lawyers’ incentives to locate all of the best arguments,219 that concern 
seems farfetched. No one contends that judges should affirmatively 
search out the best arguments for one side or the other—as discussed, 
judges lack the time and resources for such a task. Rather, the claim is 
only that if judges do see an argument missed by the parties, they 
should be free to raise it on the condition that it is closely related to 
the legal question before them, and the parties are given a chance to 
voice their views on the issue.220 Accordingly, no reasonable lawyer 
would slack off on the assumption that the judge would catch 
whatever issues she missed. 
Judge Posner seems to view his role entirely as a dispute resolver 
in the adversarial tradition, rather than also as a law pronouncer in 
the common law tradition. Perhaps the harsh results of his rule of 
judicial passivity are justified in a system in which the only parties 
that suffer are those who failed to put forward the strongest case in 
their favor. But in the United States federal courts, where decisions 
by appellate judges bind all in that jurisdiction, and all judicial 
decisions are intended to serve as accurate statements about the 
meaning of law to guide others, a poorly reasoned legal decision 
harms many more than just the party before the court.221 
IV.  ISSUE CREATION IN PRACTICE 
Part II of this Article discussed the arguments in favor of issue 
creation—arguments that have been missing from the discussion thus 
far or that have been drowned out by the rhetoric of adversarialism. 
Part III described how the values of adversarialism could be 
 
 218. Hartmann v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 9 F.3d 1207, 1214 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 219. See id. 
 220. See infra Part IV for further discussion of when and how courts should engage in issue 
creation. 
 221. See supra notes 175–76 (discussing Chayes’s and Fiss’s arguments in support of judicial 
issue creation). 
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preserved even in a system in which courts raised arguments 
overlooked or ignored by the parties. This Part takes these rationales 
for issue creation and attempts to make practical use of them by 
developing a typology of cases in which issue creation is appropriate, 
and describing the circumstances under which it is not. Drawing these 
lines is not easy, and I do not claim to provide a definitive set of 
criteria for when such determinations may be made. Nonetheless, I 
hope this Part will provide some guidance by translating the 
rationales for issue creation into a more concrete set of factors 
governing the exercise of judicial discretion to raise new issues. 
A. Factors Favoring Issue Creation 
Certain case-specific factors favor the use of issue creation. 
Courts should raise new issues when failing to do so would result in 
erroneous statements of precedent-setting law. They should also 
supplement the parties’ arguments when necessary to maintain 
control over interpretative methods. Finally, courts may need to 
engage in issue creation to give voice to legislative enactments 
disfavored or ignored by the parties, especially when no other litigant 
can vindicate those rights. 
1. Protecting Law Pronouncement.  As discussed in Part II.A.1, 
the rationale for issue creation is at its most powerful when the 
parties, either intentionally or by mistake, misrepresent the law and 
ask the court to decide the case on those grounds. Indeed, the very 
reason to give Article III judges life tenure and salary guarantees is to 
ensure that they determine the meaning of law free from outside 
influence. Accordingly, courts should not sacrifice that independence 
by deciding cases on the parties’ terms. Furthermore, judicial 
opinions set precedent that either binds the lower courts or serves as 
a guide for judges addressing the question in the future. Thus, courts 
must on occasion eschew the party presentation rule to avoid issuing 
decisions containing erroneous statements of law. 
In contrast, a court has no reason to raise issues that are 
tangential to or distinct from the claims that the parties have asked 
the court to decide, because in these cases its opinion will not mislead 
others or create flawed precedent. For example, even if a party could 
have challenged a federal statute on commerce clause grounds—as 
Justice Thomas suggested might be grounds for striking down the 
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partial birth abortion legislation at issue in Gonzales v. Carhart222—
the Court did not need to raise this issue sua sponte because its 
opinion did not risk establishing an erroneous rule of law or 
misleading precedent on that question. Moreover, questions that are 
truly independent from those that the parties have already briefed 
and argued would likely require the development of facts not already 
in the record, which is unfair to litigants who are beyond the 
discovery stage—thus providing good reason for courts to ignore 
those issues as well. 
2. Controlling Interpretive Methods.  As explained in detail in 
Part II.A.2, issue creation is also justified in cases in which the parties 
seek a decision on grounds that undermine judicial control over its 
interpretive methods. Choosing an interpretive method is an essential 
component of judging that cannot be ceded to the parties. 
Furthermore, many interpretive practices are closely related to 
prudential limits on judicial power. For example, courts have adopted 
various canons of interpretation to avoid conflict with the other 
branches of government, such as the constitutional avoidance 
doctrine and the presumption against preemption of state law. Thus, 
courts have good reasons to raise new arguments and legal sources 
when necessary to maintain these constraints on judicial 
decisionmaking.223 
3. Preserving the Integrity of Legislative Enactments.  Courts are 
also justified in engaging in issue creation if they believe that the 
parties’ positions ignore or undermine the integrity of legislative 
enactments.224 In such cases, the parties have essentially asked the 
court to disregard the law and decide the case on their terms. The 
problem is of particular concern when the executive branch has 
adopted a policy of refusing to assert a statutory standard that no 
other party would have reason to raise. Oftentimes the “case or 
controversy” limitation on judicial power will prevent a court from 
addressing a party’s refusal to rely on a statutorily created standard or 
right, and thus the problem can be resolved only by the political 
branches. But when the parties fail to raise a statute that is relevant to 
 
 222. See supra note 117. 
 223. See, e.g., Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454, 457 (1960) (applying the doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance to decide the case on statutory grounds, rather than on the 
constitutional questions raised by the petitioner); supra text accompanying notes 113–29. 
 224. See supra Part II.C. 
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the resolution of their dispute, there is no constitutional prohibition 
against a court taking notice of the overlooked statute and raising it 
sua sponte.225 
* * * 
In any of the situations described above, courts raising new issues 
must be careful to preserve the benefits of the adversarial structure. 
As discussed in Part III, in keeping with the principles of the 
adversarial system, the parties should be given notice and an 
opportunity to respond. If the parties do not wish to address the issue, 
stakeholders should be allowed to intervene, or amici invited to 
participate, so that they can serve this purpose. Using these methods, 
courts can protect the judicial function without sacrificing the benefits 
of an adversarial exchange on the new issue. 
B. Issue Creation and the Judicial Hierarchy 
The need for issue creation may also vary with the tier of court 
asked to decide the matter. Issue creation comes with a slightly 
different set of costs and benefits at each level of the federal court 
system, and thus the place of the court in the judicial hierarchy should 
be factored into a court’s decision of whether to raise an issue sua 
sponte. 
1. District Courts.  District courts do not set precedent, 
suggesting that issue creation is less vital at this lowest level of the 
federal court system. District court decisions receive significantly less 
press and popular attention than those of higher level courts, and thus 
are less likely to mislead the public about the meaning of the law. 
Even so, district courts have an obligation to state the law accurately. 
Every Article III court plays the dual role of deciding cases while 
declaring the meaning of law. The district court’s statements about 
 
 225. Dickerson is an example of just such a case. The executive refused to raise 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3501, relying instead on the stricter standard for admission of confessions provided in 
Miranda, and yet Congress had intended that statutory standard to displace Miranda. No 
criminal defendant would argue that the statute set the relevant standard for admission of 
confessions, of course, because it purported to establish a more lenient rule for admitting 
confessions. Without a court’s intervention, the statute would lie dormant. Thus, issue creation 
was appropriate in Dickerson to protect Congress’s legislative role. The need for issue creation 
in such cases is particularly important because otherwise the executive branch could co-opt 
courts, benefitting from legal decisions by politically insulated courts that appear to sanction the 
executive’s view of the law. 
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the meaning of law are not limited to the individuals specifically 
before it, but are intended to describe the law as it applies to all. The 
fact that the district court’s decision binds only the parties at hand 
makes it no less a statement of “law” than a Supreme Court opinion, 
thus justifying issue creation in some cases. In addition, district courts 
have the same interest as appellate courts in protecting legislative 
enactments and preserving their interpretive role. 
Furthermore, as a practical matter, district courts are in the best 
position to raise new issues because they need not be as concerned 
about finality, or the possibility of prejudice, as an appellate court 
considering whether to raise a new issue sua sponte. At the pretrial 
stage, the parties can explore factual questions essential to the new 
legal issue, and there is far less disruption to settled expectations than 
when an issue is injected by a court further down the line. 
Thus, while district courts have slightly less compelling reasons 
to raise new issues than appellate courts, doing so comes with fewer 
costs to the litigants. Furthermore, by raising overlooked issues early 
on, district court judges can avoid putting appellate courts into the 
difficult position of choosing whether to insert a new legal question 
into litigation at the eleventh hour. 
2. Courts of Appeals.  Appellate courts have yet another set of 
considerations to keep in mind when deciding whether to engage in 
issue creation. Circuit court decisions create precedent binding on all 
future three-judge panels and district courts in that circuit, and create 
persuasive precedent for judges outside the jurisdiction. Most 
appellate decisions will stand as the final word on a legal question in 
light of the rarity of either en banc or Supreme Court review.226 Thus, 
it is exceedingly important that appellate courts get decisions right. 
Furthermore, like district courts, circuit courts have no choice but to 
hear and decide the cases brought before them—no matter how 
inadequately presented—and thus they cannot simply avoid 
addressing a poorly briefed legal question as can the United States 
Supreme Court. Issue creation would thus seem most justified at the 
circuit court level. 
 
 226. See, e.g., Douglas H. Ginsburg & Brian M. Boynton, The Court En Banc: 1991–2002, 70 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 259, 266 (2002) (“As infrequently as the D.C. Circuit heard cases en banc 
[during fiscal years 1997–99], at .58% of total case dispositions it had the highest en banc 
percentage of all the circuits.”). 
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Nonetheless, there are good reasons for appellate judges to be 
cautious about raising new legal questions at this late stage of the 
litigation. An issue that turns on facts that are not in the record or not 
fully developed would be better left unmentioned for fear of 
prejudice to the parties. Moreover, any question of law that requires 
development of new facts would likely be tangential to the questions 
the court is asked to resolve, and thus would not qualify as a case in 
which issue creation was essential to avoid erroneous statements of 
law.227 Furthermore, raising new questions on appeal may delay 
resolution and put litigants to additional expense. As described in 
Part III, to preserve the adversarial structure, the parties must be 
given time to submit supplemental briefs, or at the very least be put 
on notice that they will be asked to address the new issue at oral 
argument. If the parties do not take opposing positions on the 
question, the panel should consider assigning an amicus to address it. 
Finally, if the parties have argued the case for months or years before 
a district court on one set of issues, they will likely feel ambushed by 
an appellate court that injects a brand new set of legal questions into 
the case. Thus, appellate courts should be aware of these costs of 
issue creation and should weigh them carefully against the benefits. 
3. Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court seems to have the least 
reason of any court to engage in issue creation because it retains 
nearly complete control over its docket, and thus can avoid deciding 
cases in which the parties fail to raise relevant legal questions. If the 
parties fail to present the issue accurately at the certiorari stage, the 
Court should simply deny certiorari and await a case in which at least 
one of the parties articulates what the Court believes is the correct 
legal issue. In contrast, the district and appellate courts have no 
discretion to remove cases from their dockets, and thus would have 
greater reason to supplement the parties’ arguments from time to 
time. 
Furthermore, most cases before the Supreme Court have been 
litigated for years before several tribunals, and thus it is particularly 
unfair to the parties to inject a new issue into litigation that has been 
framed and argued consistently on different grounds. Likewise, the 
factual record will have been developed to respond only to those legal 
questions that were raised initially, and the Court cannot resolve a 
legal issue that turns on facts not already in the record. Finally, the 
 
 227. See supra text accompanying note 222. 
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delay and disruption created by a remand to uncover new facts would 
be hard on the parties, who are seeking resolution of their case. For 
these reasons, the Court should have less cause than lower courts to 
engage in issue creation, and should be sensitive to the hardship on 
the parties were it to do so. 
Nonetheless, there will be occasions on which the Supreme 
Court has very good reasons to hear a case in which the parties have 
failed to brief an issue. For example, the Court might conclude that 
an especially important or disruptive lower court decision on 
questions of pressing national importance demands immediate 
Supreme Court review even when the parties are not up to the task of 
adequately briefing the case. Or a party may have abandoned an 
argument below, as sometimes happens when a change in the 
administration leads to reversals of the executive branch’s litigating 
position, and the Court may conclude that it is essential to pass on the 
lower court’s resolution of the issue even though no party to the case 
defends that ruling.228 In addition, the Court may need to engage in 
issue creation to reverse one of its own precedents. The parties will 
often hesitate to challenge a precedent directly, preferring to 
distinguish it from their case, and thus the Court may be forced to 
raise the issue on its own motion.229 Finally, the Justices may not be 
fully cognizant of all the legal questions implicated in a case until the 
Court receives the briefs on the merits, and thus only at this late stage 
may the Court recognize that the parties have avoided a question that 
it thinks is essential to issuing an accurate statement of law. 
When these situations arise, the Supreme Court has particularly 
good reasons to raise the overlooked legal question. Due to its 
position atop the federal court hierarchy, it is essential that the Court 
get the law right. The Court’s decisions are binding on all courts, state 
and federal, and constitute high-profile statements on the meaning of 
 
 228. E.g., Goldsboro Christian Schs., Inc. v. United States, 456 U.S. 922, 922 (1982) (inviting 
William Coleman to brief and argue the case as an amicus after the United States abandoned 
the position it had taken below); see also supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text. 
 229. In a few of the cases discussed in Part I.B, the Court overturned precedent that the 
parties had not thought to question. E.g., Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79–80 (1938) 
(disapproving the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842)); see also, e.g., Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654–55 (1961) (overruling an aspect of Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), 
as that case had been interpreted up to that time). A more recent example is Pearson v. 
Callahan, in which the Court granted the petition on the two questions presented and then 
asked the parties to address the additional question of “[w]hether the Court’s decision in 
Saucier v. Katz should be overruled.” Pearson v. Callahan, 128 S. Ct. 1702, 1702–03 (2008) 
(citation omitted). 
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law. Moreover, the Court’s opinions carry weight that other courts’ 
decisions lack. Supreme Court opinions that implicitly sanction 
unconstitutional conduct by the executive or legislative branches can 
mislead the nation about the limits on governmental power, 
establishing precedent-by-practice that may be hard to undo later.230 
The imprimatur of a Supreme Court opinion upholding a specific 
practice—and thus implying that the practice at issue is 
constitutional—could establish a new legal rule even if that was far 
from the Court’s intention. Furthermore, the Court would undermine 
its own legitimacy if it ruled one way in a poorly briefed case, only to 
quickly reverse itself in a future case in which the issue was squarely 
presented. Thus, at the Supreme Court level, getting the law right is 
more important than at any other. 
For many of the same reasons, it is particularly important that 
the Court retain control over its interpretive methods. The Court is 
the standard bearer in this realm as well, and can serve as a guide to 
the lower courts. Many of the Court’s interpretive choices are based 
on its views regarding the appropriate judicial role—which is most 
evident in the constitutional avoidance doctrine, but can also be seen 
in various clear statement rules and presumptions about the meaning 
of legislation. The parties should not be allowed to disrupt this 
exercise of judicial discretion, forcing the Court to issue decisions that 
transgress these self-imposed boundaries. 
* * * 
This Article does not contend that judges should be given the 
power to set their own agenda—a role for which politically insulated 
judges are ill suited. Judges should limit issue creation to situations in 
which the parties’ arguments misstate the law, undermine legislative 
enactments, or deprive the court of its preferred interpretive 
methodology. In these circumstances, issue creation is necessary to 
prevent litigants from undermining the judiciary’s role in the 
constitutional structure. 
The cases discussed in Part I satisfy these criteria. In Erie 
Railroad v. Tompkins, the question of whether the federal courts had 
the authority to create federal common law was a necessary precursor 
 
 230. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Non-Judicial Precedent, 61 VAND. L. REV. 713, 745–53 (2008) 
(discussing the limited scope of judicial review of the actions of nonjudicial actors that implicate 
constitutional issues). 
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to the dispute over whether Tompkins should be treated as a licensee 
or trespasser.231 In Washington v. Davis, the Court rejected the 
parties’ interpretation of the Constitution in the course of 
determining whether the defendant had violated the Equal Protection 
Clause.232 In Dickerson v. United States, the Court asked whether a 
statute displaced the judicially established rule for admission of 
confessions, which would then affect its conclusion about whether 
Dickerson’s confession could be admitted against him.233 In all three 
cases, the Court reasonably concluded that its obligation to issue 
accurate pronouncements of law, to protect legislative enactments, 
and to preserve its preferred interpretive methodology justified 
deviation from the party presentation norm. 
To be sure, the Court did not handle these situations perfectly. In 
both Erie and Washington, the Court did not ask the parties to brief 
the question, nor did it assign an amicus to do so, depriving itself of 
the benefits of an adversary presentation and the parties of a fair 
hearing on the matter. Perhaps it is these violations of form, rather 
than the act of issue creation, that has given issue creation its bad 
name. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the strong norm in favor of party presentation, in 
practice judges regularly engage in judicial issue creation. Courts raise 
legal arguments, claims, and sources overlooked by the parties, and 
their rules permit active participation by amici. On occasion, courts 
will even assign an amicus curiae to argue a position that no party to 
the case supports. These practices are in tension with the rhetoric in 
favor of party presentation—rhetoric grounded on the longstanding 
view that judicial issue creation is antithetical to adversarial theory. 
Rather than condemn these practices, this Article demonstrates 
that the judicial role in the constitutional structure and common law 
tradition justifies giving courts the discretion to raise new legal claims 
and arguments when failure to do so would lead to inaccurate or 
misleading statements of law. Federal courts are charged with the task 
 
 231. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78–80 (holding that federal courts have no power to create 
“federal general common law”). 
 232. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238 (1976) (reversing the lower court’s decision 
on a ground not presented by the parties). 
 233. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) (holding that Congress could 
not supersede a constitutional ruling of the Supreme Court by statute). 
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of expounding on the meaning of law, and they are provided with life 
tenure and salary protection to ensure they do so without interference 
from the other two branches or the public. In the common law 
tradition, decisions by federal courts of appeals create binding 
precedent that must be followed in subsequent litigation within that 
jurisdiction. To preserve their role in law exposition, judges must 
maintain control over case presentation when the parties fail to fully 
and accurately describe the meaning of legal standards. 
Moreover, and contrary to conventional wisdom, this Article has 
shown that judicial issue creation is compatible with the values 
underlying the adversarial tradition. Adversarialism requires that the 
parties have an opportunity for a dialectical exchange on the 
questions at issue in the case, allowing the judge to avoid becoming 
an advocate for one party or interest, but it does not demand judicial 
passivity in the face of litigants’ mischaracterization of legal 
standards. As long as courts provide an opportunity for the parties to 
respond to new issues (or allow amici or intervenors to do so when 
the parties decline), then courts can simultaneously protect their 
power to pronounce on legal questions and preserve the benefits of 
the adversarial system. 
